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1 Introduction
Every quarter, the SEC requires public corporations to disclose a range of fundamental
information via “earnings announcements.” These information releases are arguably the pri-
mary conduit for corporate communication to investors and often generate dramatic equity
price movements as prices quickly impound new information. As an example, almost 20%
of Google’s total equity price volatility occurs on the four days following earnings releases.
Large literatures model earnings, study the theoretical pricing of earnings risks and the
ex-post response of equity prices to the information releases, both contemporaneously (earn-
ings response coefficients) and with lags (e.g., post earnings announcement drift). Overall,
earnings announcements and risks are key events driving equity returns and prices.
This paper studies the pricing of earnings risk in option prices.1 These announcements
generate fundamentally different risks compared to Brownian or Poisson risks in asset pricing
models due to their predictable timing. To see this, Figure 1 graphs short dated option
implied volatilities (IVs) for Intel Corporation with earnings announcement dates (EADs)
marked with a circle. IVs increase predictably prior to and sharply decrease after earnings
are announced (previously noted by Patell and Wolfson (PW) (1979, 1981)). The goal of
this paper is to incorporate earnings announcements and risks into option pricing models, to
use option prices to extract option-implied ex-ante information about the impact of earnings
risks on equity prices, and to study the information content of these announcements.
On the theoretical side, we specify new option pricing models building on Piazzesi (2000)
with deterministically timed jumps on earnings dates with random sizes. This “earnings
risk” model naturally generates the IV patterns seen in the data and motivates estimators of
the ex-ante equity price uncertainty associated with an earnings announcement, essentially
1This paper subsumes and extends Dubinsky and Johannes (2006).
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Figure 1: Short-term ATM implied volatility (Intel Corporation)
This figure shows the implied volatility of Intel (INTC) calculated as the average of the put and call implied
volatility of the contracts closest to at-the-money (moneyness is defined as K/F where F is the forward
price of the underlying) for the shortest available option maturity. The sample period is from January 2000
to August 2015. Red circles indicate earnings announcement days.
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the option implied price volatility associated with the news. A simplified version of our
general model provides the intuition.
Consider an extension of the Black-Scholes model with a single, predictably timed price
jump occurring at time τj (the EAD) whose size is normally distributed with a volatility of
σQj , where Q is the risk-neutral probability. Equity prices are log-normally distributed, and
option prices are given by a modification of the Black-Scholes formula. For an option with
time to maturity T and t < τj ≤ t+ T , the IV at time t is
σt,T =
√
σ2 +
(
σQj
)2
/T , (1)
where σ is the diffusive volatility. This simple model delivers three general implications of
earnings announcements: (1) IVs increase continuously and nonlinearly prior to an EAD (as
T decreases), (2) IV discontinuously falls after the announcement, and (3) the term structure
of IV is downward sloping prior to the announcement. The first two of these implications
generate the distinctive pattern in Figure 1 and were previously noted in Patell and Wolfson
(1981). We will mainly rely on the third implication for our empirical work.
The central quantity is the ex-ante earnings price volatility σQj , the risk-neutral antici-
pated announcement volatility. This parameter is a reduced form, capturing the impact of
all information released, not just current quarter earnings or forward guidance. Earnings
risks naturally vary over time and across firms, and an intermediate goal is to develop easy-
to-compute and accurate option based estimators of this parameter.2 Equation 1 can be
used to develop ex-ante estimators of σQj using options of different maturities (term struc-
ture estimators) and ex-post estimators of σQj based on the post announcement decrease in
IV (time series estimators).3 We also consider more general models incorporating stochastic
2Estimating realized earnings announcement volatility is difficult using only a single observation.
3Although these estimators assume constant volatility, Section 2.2 shows the estimators are largely robust
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volatility and Poisson driven jumps in prices and perform a structural estimation.
Given this theoretical framework, our main contributions are empirical. Using a broad
dataset of actively traded firms from 2000 – 2015, we characterize the information embedded
in options regarding earnings risks. We first extend the initial work of Patell and Wolfson
(1981) testing the impact of earnings announcements on option prices. Two of our tests are
related to those in PW, but the third is new. These tests document strong evidence that
earnings announcements affect option prices (consistent with Figure 1).
Our next goal is to quantify earnings uncertainty. Using estimators derived from Equation
1, estimates indicate that ex-ante earnings uncertainty is large, statistically significant, and
varies both across firms and time. There is a strong business cycle pattern, with the level
and cross-sectional variation in earnings risks increasing substantially in recessions. For
our sample, the average earnings uncertainty ranges from roughly 4%− 6% during pre and
post crisis expansions to approximately 10 − 11% at the height of the 2000 – 2002 or 2008
– 2009 recession, respectively. Cross-sectional earnings uncertainty dispersion increases in
recessions, more than doubling from less than 3% to over 6%.
In terms of informational content, ex-ante option based estimates of earnings volatility
are highly informative about future realized equity volatility: the ex-ante estimates have a
correlation of more than 50% with subsequently realized price volatility after the announce-
ment. This is close to what could maximally be expected given normal sampling errors
in realized volatility. The cross-sectional correlation between option implied average earn-
ings volatility and subsequent post-earnings daily equity volatility is roughly 85%. Earnings
volatility estimates also provide incremental information in forecasting the following month’s
equity volatility relative to diffusive IV (e.g., Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1993), and Jiang et al. (2005)).
to stochastic volatility. We also calibrate formal stochastic volatility models in Section 4.7.
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Another commonly used measure of firm level uncertainty is the dispersion in analysts
earnings forecasts, based on the idea that firms with higher earnings uncertainty are more
difficult to analyze, which in turn generates a broader range of analyst forecasts. We find no
significant relationship between dispersion of analysts forecasts with our measure, consistent
with Diether et al. (2002). We also find that in our sample the dispersion of analysts forecasts
has no statistical ability to forecast post-earnings daily equity volatility.
We next analyze the pricing of earnings announcement risks. For index options, there is
strong evidence for volatility and/or Poisson drive jump risk premiums (see, e.g., Pan (2002),
Broadie et al. (2007)). Quantifying earnings volatility risk premiums is straightforward given
precise estimates of σQj for each EAD, which can be compared to realized earnings volatility in
a number of ways. One way compares averages of σQj to close-to-open equity return volatilities
on EADs, which assumes all of the overnight price move is from earnings induced jumps. We
also construct measures based on close-to-close returns, allowing for some ‘digestion’ time
for prices to adjust after the open, compute standardized returns (which are less sensitive to
outliers), and analyze straddle returns.
Every measure points to significant earnings jump risk premiums. Average option implied
earnings day volatility is 8.22% for the full-sample compared to a realized announcement day
volatility of 7.42%, a premium of 80 bps. Focusing only on close-to-open returns (assuming
all of the effect occurs at the open), the average premium is 56 bps. Averages are sensitive
to outliers, and the results are stronger using medians, trimmed estimates, or standardized
returns. The risk premium is consistent with a significant systematic component in earnings
risks: ex-ante earnings volatility estimates are strongly related to historical equity beta, with
a correlation of roughly 60% across firms.
To connect earnings uncertainty risk premium estimates with economically interesting
quantities, we compute at-the-money straddle returns on EADs. The straddle positions are
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opened prior to the EAD and closed the next day. The average (median) EAD straddle
return is −8% (−10%). We compute bootstrap returns to account for the fact that straddle
returns are generally negative, and results confirm statistically significant straddle returns
consistent with an economically significant earnings jump risk premium. These risk premium
results are related to robust patterns of equity returns around earnings dates. First noted by
Beaver (1968), there are positive average equity returns for firms announcing earnings (see
also Cohen et al. (2007) and Frazzini and Lamont (2007)). Savor and Wilson (2016) provide
a model based explanation for the firm level earnings announcement premium. Our results
contribute to this literature by documenting a robust earnings jump volatility risk premium.
Finally, we build continuous-time stochastic volatility (SV) models incorporating ran-
domly timed and earnings induced price jumps. These models allow us to quantify the
impact of earnings via option pricing errors and the relative importance of EADs, SV and
randomly timed jumps. Using IVs, we estimate the SV models for some of the largest firms
in our sample: Amazon, General Electric, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and Qualcomm. We again
find strong earnings effects, which are strongest around EADs where pricing errors can be
more than 50% lower when incorporating earnings jumps. Pure SV models cannot fit term
structure IV patterns observed around EADs, resulting in large pricing errors. For example,
average pricing errors for AMZN the day prior to earnings are 8.11%, 2.53%, and 3.82% for
short, medium, and long term options, respectively, and fall to 3.69%, 1.49%, and 1.70%, re-
spectively, when incorporating earnings announcements. Although there are only four EADs
per year, overall option pricing errors fall on average by almost 20%. EADs are far more
important than Poisson price jumps.
Our results have other research implications. There is a growing literature using firm
IVs, either directly or via a variance risk premium calculation, as regressors or for portfolio
sorts. These procedures may be sensitive to EADs and factors such as option maturity that
6
are unrelated to the research questions. For example, consider a firm with σ = 25% and
an average sized earnings jump volatility of 7.3%. From equation 1, the IV of a 2 week
option is almost 44% but only 32% for an option expiring in 6 weeks. Thus, for options
spanning EADs, there is significant IV variation unrelated to fundamentals from maturity
effects. An et al. (2014), for instance, sort stocks by changes in 30-day IVs, arguing that
sharp increases in IV can be linked to informed trading. Our model suggests that firms with
rapidly increasing IVs are also more likely to announce earnings. Similarly, Baltussen et al.
(2016) use short-term options and calculate the standard deviation of the IV over a calendar
month. Our model suggests that firms with the highest volatility of IV are biased towards
announcing firms, given the pattern of IVs around EADs, independent of fundamentals.
We show empirically that earnings announcements increase the noise in the measurement
of IV-based sort variables and provide guidance on how to minimize the impact of earnings
announcement related time variation in IVs on cross-sectional studies.
All of our implications generally apply to other predictable events including macroe-
conomic announcements and elections, referendums, summits or other scheduled meetings
(e.g., OPEC semi-annual meetings). As an example, consider the Brexit vote on June 23rd,
2016. Just prior to the vote, 1-month and 2-month USD/GBP currency IV was 28.21% and
21.51%, respectively. The term structure estimate of the Brexit impact on the USD/GBP
exchange rate was 7.45%. The pound fell 7.6% on the day following the vote. A similar
pattern occurred prior to the US 2016 election. Kelly et al. (2016) analyze the impact of
predictable national elections and global summits on option prices.
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2 Incorporating Earnings Announcements in Equity
Price Models
2.1 Stochastic Volatility Models
This section incorporates earnings announcement risks into continuous-time SV models.
The first step is a model of how earnings announcements impact equity prices. Earnings
announcements normally occur outside of normal trading hours, either after the 4:00 p.m.
market close or before the formal 9:30 a.m. open. We assume earnings induce a jump or
discontinuity in the continuous-time price path. The jump assumption is intuitive, consistent
with existing work analyzing macroeconomic announcement effects (e.g., Piazzesi (2005) and
Beber and Brandt (2006)), consistent with statistical evidence identifying announcements
as the cause of jumps in jump-diffusion models (Johannes (2004) and Barndorff-Nielsen and
Shephard (2006)), and parsimonious.4 For earnings announced during normal market hours,
Patell and Wolfson (1984) find the bulk of the price response occurs within the first few
minutes. For earnings announced outside of normal market hours, Martineau (2017) argues
earnings news arrives as a ”jump”, with 80% of the price response occurring within the first
few trades after news is released (see also Lee (2012)).
Formally, Ndt counts EADs prior to time t: N
d
t =
∑
j 1[τj≤t] where 1 is the indicator
function and τj is an increasing sequence of predictable stopping times representing earnings
announcements. The jump size, Zj = log
(
Sτj/Sτj−
)
, is distributed according to a known
distribution, Zj|Fτj− ∼ pi (Zj, τj−). In addition to earnings jumps, price jumps can arrive
at random times τ¯j via a Poisson process N¯t with intensity λ¯y and jump size Z¯j. We do
4Over finite sampling periods, it is always possible to construct a stochastic volatility model with similar
distribution implications to a jump model. These models are generally more complicated than simple jump
models, which is one reason why the literature typically models these events as price ”jumps”, rather than
a large spike in diffusive volatility.
8
not consider other predictable events such as mid-quarter earnings updates, stock splits, or
mergers and acquisitions although these do have interesting implications (see, e.g., Bester
et al. (2013)). We assume a square-root SV process, thus prices and variance processes solve:
dSt =
(
µ− λ¯yψt
)
Stdt+
√
VtStdW
s
t + d
(∑Ndt
j=1
Sτj−
[
eZj − 1])+ d(∑N¯t
j=1
Sτ¯j−
[
eZ¯j − 1
])
,
dVt = κv (θv − Vt) dt+ σv
√
VtdW
v
t ,
where ψt is the random jump compensator and dW
s
t dW
v
t = ρdt. This process is well defined
in continuous-time.5
The jump Zj captures the equity price response to the information released in the earnings
announcement. Firms report the current quarter’s cash flow, balance sheet and income
statement, and many firms also provide forward-looking information and answer questions
via conference calls with analysts and investors. The jump sizes translate this valuation-
relevant information into shocks in equity prices. Therefore, the jump distribution pi serves
as a reduced form model of how fundamental information affects prices.
The volatility of Zj, σ
P
j = std
P
(
Zj|Fτj−
)
is a central parameter of interest, capturing the
ex-ante anticipated uncertainty regarding the equity price response to the announcement
information. To understand its sources, consider an earnings response model of Ball and
Brown (1968): Zj = α+β
(
Eτj − Eˆτj−
)
+ετj , where Eˆ is an estimate of current earnings. In
this model, the equity price response is driven by unexpected earnings and other announce-
ment shocks. The variance of equity prices due to the information released in the earnings
announcement is
(
σPj
)2
= β2var
(
Eτj − Eˆτj−|Fτj−
)
+ σ2ε .
This useful decomposition implies that the earnings response coefficient β, the variance
5This process is a well-defined semi-martingale that is continuous from the right with left limits, see, e.g.,
Protter (2005) for formal definitions. Prices are a product of an affine component and a discrete jump at
earnings announcements.
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of unexpected earnings news, and other shocks drive the equity price response to earnings
announcements. Empirically identifying the different sources of earnings induced equity
volatility is difficult: earnings response models generate small R2’s, normally less than 10%,
for various reasons (nonlinearities, inaccurate estimates of expected earnings, the importance
of forward guidance, small samples, etc.). Imhoff and Lobo (1992) and Ang and Zhang
(2005) report R2’s between 3-6%, which implies that most of the price response to earnings
announcements is unexplained by standard regressors. This motivates our focus on the EAD
jump volatility as a reduced form of the valuation relevant uncertainty.
To price options, we construct a measure Q under which discounted prices are martin-
gales. Risk corrections for randomly timed jumps and Brownian motions are standard. At
predictable EADs, the martingale restriction implies that the pre-jump expected value of the
post-jump equity price equals the pre-jump equity price, that is EQ
[
Sτj |Fτj−
]
= Sτj− (see
Piazzesi (2000)). In terms of risk premiums, we assume that under Q, prices and volatilities
are affine, that the risk-neutral jump intensity is λ¯Qy and Z¯j (Q) ∼ N
(
µ¯Qy ,
(
σ¯Qy
)2)
:
dSt =
(
rt − λ¯QyEQt
[
eZ¯j(Q) − 1
])
Stdt+
√
VtStdW
s
t (Q) + d
(∑Ndt
j=1
Sτj−
[
eZj(Q) − 1])
+ d
(∑N¯t(Q)
j=1
Sτ¯j−
[
eZ¯j(Q) − 1
])
dVt = κ
Q
v
(
θQv − Vt
)
dt+ σv
√
VtdW
v
t (Q) .
The only no-arbitrage constraint for jump distribution measure changes is common sup-
port, thus, for example, state variables could appear in one measure but not the other or
that the distributional form could change. We assume EAD jump sizes are normal under
Q : piQ
(
Zj|Fτj−
) ∼ N (−1
2
(
σQj
)2
,
(
σQj
)2)
. This is parsimonious: there is a single earnings
jump parameter on each EAD and estimating σQj is a primary focus of the paper. The model
is affine, facilitating option pricing. Appendix A.1 discusses option pricing in the general
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SV model. We use this model for formal structural estimation. The next sections use a
simplified version to develop easy-to-implement and robust estimators of σQj .
It is useful to note that deterministic and random price jumps have fundamentally differ-
ent effects on the shape and dynamics of IV curves, and hence these different model classes
are identified by entirely different data. The steepness of the short term IV curve is par-
ticularly informative about the parameters of the random jump process (see for instance
Broadie et al. (2007)) whereas deterministic jumps have virtually no effect on the slope of
IV curves, see Equation (1). In contrast, deterministic jumps affect the term structure and
the time-series behavior of IVs, two features that are largely unaffected by Poisson driven
price jumps. Our estimation procedure captures these model features and allows us to ex-
tract earnings announcement jump information from ATM options only. Out-of-the-money
(OTM) and in-the-money (ITM) options are useful in our framework mainly to distinguish
between random jumps, SV and earnings announcement jumps.
2.2 A Simple Model and Earnings Uncertainty Estimators
To estimate σQj , consider a model with constant volatility and price jumps on EADs:
St = S0 exp
[(
r − 1
2
σ2
)
t+ σWt (Q) +
∑Ndt
j=1
Zj (Q)
]
, (2)
where Zj (Q) = −12
(
σQj
)2
+ σQj εj(Q) and εj(Q)
i.i.d∼ N (0,1). Since Wt (Q) and
∑Ndt
j=1 Zj (Q)
are normally distributed, prices are log-normal. A European option with time to maturity
T is given by the Black-Scholes formula with a modified volatility input:
σ2t,T = σ
2 + T−1
∑
j: t<τj≤t+T
(
σQj
)2
. (3)
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This model provides the main implications of earnings announcements for option prices.
First, assuming one announcement before maturity, annualized implied variance is σ2τj−,T =
σ2 +T−1
(
σQj
)2
just before the announcement and σ2τj ,T = σ
2 after the announcement. Thus,
IV discontinuously drops immediately after the announcement. Second, implied variance
increases at the rate proportional to T−1 into the event. Third, holding the number of jumps
constant, the term structure of IVs slopes downward.
This suggests two estimators of σQj , one based on the IV term structure and the other
based on IV dynamics. Given two options with time to maturity T1 and T2 (T1 < T2) and a
single EAD prior to maturity, then σ2t,T1 > σ
2
t,T2
and σQj can be estimated via:
(
σQj, term
)2
=
σ2t,T1 − σ2t,T2
T−11 − T−12
. (4)
We label this ex-ante estimator the term structure estimator as it uses IV term structure
information prior to the EAD. The second estimator uses changes in IV. Assuming an earn-
ings announcement after the close on date t (or before the open on the next trading date),
then the post-announcement IV is σ (assuming no other EADs prior to maturity). Solving
for earnings jump volatility gives the time series estimator
(
σQj, time
)2
= T
(
σ2τj−,T − σ2τj+1/252,T−1/252
)
. (5)
To provide a concrete example, on October 23, 2014, Amazon.com released earnings
after market close. The IV of at-the-money (ATM) options expiring in 8 and 15 days was
75.28% and 54.37%, respectively, which implies σQj, term = 10.26%. Short-dated option IV
falls to 29.36% after the EAD, which implies σQj, time = 9.87%. This is a typical example with
quantitatively similar estimates, even if they use different information.
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Although these estimators assume no SV or randomly-timed price jumps, estimates are
quite robust to both factors. To see this, consider parameter values in line with Bakshi et al.
(2012) and our estimates in Section 4.7: θQv = 0.4
2, σv = 0.6, ρ = −0.4, λ¯Qy = 5, µ¯Qy = 0,
σ¯Qy = 0.05 and σ
Q
j = 0.08. For the term structure estimator, the main bias arises from mean
reversion in Vt when spot volatility is significantly higher or lower than its long run average.
To understand the bias magnitude, consider an extreme case where κQv = 2 (about twice
the value we estimate in Section 4.7) and that Vt is twice its long-run average. For typical
maturities in our sample, T1 = 2/52 and T2 = 6/52, σ
Q
term = 0.0848. If spot variance is 50%
of its long run value, σQterm = 0.0785. These biases of individual estimates of σ
Q
j are small
in absolute terms, but also relative to microstructure noise. For example, typical bid-ask
spreads on equity options are at least $0.05 to $0.10 for options that are often less than $1
or $2, which could induce significant noise in IVs. In addition, since the term structure in
our sample is flat on average, any biases are likely to average out over the sample period.
Building on Merton (1976), Hull and White (1987), and Bates (1996), Appendix A.2
analyzes the estimators under model misspecification. The term structure estimator is robust
for many reasons: (a) it does not depend on σv or realized shocks; (b) diffusive volatility is
highly persistent, thus κQv is small; (c) the term structure of IV is flat, which implies that
θQv ≈ θv and/or that κQv is very small; and (d) we use short-dated options, typically less
than two months. The time series estimator is less robust as it relies on shock realizations
over the next day and is sensitive to any lagged responses. These biases could directionally
bias the results: large positive shocks downward-bias estimates more than large negative
shocks upward-bias estimates (see Appendix A.2). Although we report both, the time series
estimator is noisier, thus we primarily focus on the term structure estimates.
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2.3 Literature Review and Discussion
Our work relates to a number of papers using time series data to analyze earnings announce-
ments. A large literature (e.g., Ball and Brown (1968), Kim and Verrecchia (1991), Penman
(1984), etc.) analyze the equity price response to earnings announcements. There are also
anomalous movements around EADs (e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1990), Frazzini and Peder-
sen (2014), Barber et al. (2013)). Hanweck (1994) finds that Treasury bond and Eurodollar
futures are more volatile on unemployment announcement days and builds a model to cap-
ture this effect.6 Patell and Wolfson (1984) study the price response to intraday earnings
announcements using transaction data and find most of the response occurs within minutes,
which is important as we assume announcements induce a discontinuous jump. Maheu and
McCurdy (2004) analyze GARCH jump models, assume the jump intensity increases on
EADs, and find that many of the jumps they identify occurred on EADs. Andersen et al.
(2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Savor and Wilson (2013) and Lucca and Moench
(2015) study the impact of predictable macroeconomic announcements on equity prices.
Our paper is closely related to Patell and Wolfson (PW) (1979, 1981) who provide early
descriptive work on IV dynamics around EADs. Their model has deterministically changing
diffusive volatility and test whether IV increases prior to and drops after an EAD. Patell
and Wolfson (1979) find mixed evidence using annual EADs from 1974 to 1978, while Patell
and Wolfson (1981) find stronger evidence using quarterly EADs from 1976 to 1977. There
are a number of importance differences between our approach/results and PWs. First,
we can easily incorporate SV in our model, while extending PW to handle SV requires
deterministically-timed jumps in SV. Second, PW’s model does not allow earnings uncer-
tainty to change across measures, as it is a diffusive model. Third, we provide ex-ante
6We would like to thank Bob McDonald for pointing out Hanweck (1994), an unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation.
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estimators of anticipated earnings risks. Fourth, we do not require any assumptions about
pi. Fifth, PW do not directly estimate the earnings uncertainty, rather they test the increase
and decrease in IV.
Ederington and Lee (1996) and Beber and Brandt (2006) analyze announcement effects
in Treasury bond futures options. Ederington and Lee (1996) find that IV falls after an-
nouncements. Beber and Brandt (2006) analyze the implied pricing density and find that,
in addition to IV falling, implied skewness and kurtosis also change. Related to this, Don-
ders and Vorst (1996), Donders et al. (2000) and Isakov and Perignon (2001) apply PW’s
approach to European options markets. Whaley and Cheung (1982) argue that the informa-
tional content of earnings announcements is rapidly incorporated into option prices whereas
Diavatopoulos et al. (2012) test whether option-implied skewness and kurtosis provide infor-
mation about subsequent equity and option returns around EADs.
Kelly et al. (2016) study the pricing of political risk around events such as elections, and
document strong effects generated by their predictable timing, consistent with our results
from earnings announcements. Their model differs from ours as elections may induce a policy
shift, which in turn, could persistently shift volatilities. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013) provide
additional equilibrium results.
Subsequent to Dubinsky and Johannes (2006), Barth and So (2014) use our estimators to
study the impact of earnings announcements on market-wide, non-diversifiable volatility risk.
They find earnings announcements contribute to volatility changes and command a premium.
Rogers et al. (2009) study how management earnings forecasts affect IV, arguing that bad
news disclosure affects short- and long-term IV whereas long-term IV remains unaffected by
other disclosures. Neururer et al. (2015) find that the uncertainty measured by IVs prior
to EADs declines with the firms’ reputation. Billings and Jennings (2011) normalize option
prices prior to announcements by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast to
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separate equity market reaction to earnings information from earnings uncertainty.
3 Data
We use option price data from OptionMetrics’ IvyDB. Due to microstructure concerns such
as bid-ask spreads and non-synchronous trading, we focus on actively traded firms. For each
calendar year in our sample, we rank all firms by dollar trade volume. From each of these
yearly rankings, we eliminate firms with an average quarterly dividend yield of more than
2% and firms whose equity price traded below $5. The focus on firms without excessive
dividend yields minimizes any issues associated with pricing options on high-dividend firms.
Unlike indices, whose dividend payments are usually modeled as continuous, dividends on
individual equities are discrete. Options on low equity price firms generates numerical issues
when computing IVs because strikes are usually quoted in either $1 or $2.5 increments,
implying that options are often either extremely deep in-the-money or out-of-the-money.
Finally, we limit our analysis to firms with CRSP share code 10 or 11 (common stock).
Next, we identify the exact date and time of the earnings announcements from Thom-
son Reuters, the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) and Compustat. Thomson
Reuters and IBES provide dates and times (either a time stamp or an indicator to determine
if the announcement was before market open or after market close), whereas Compustat
only provides dates. We find substantial disagreement over the dates and/or exact times
(see also DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)) and use the following reconciliation approach. First,
we require that the EAD is recorded in at least two of the three sources. As we focus on
actively traded firms, there are only occasional gaps in Thomson Reuters’ coverage while
Computstat and IBES provide nearly full coverage. If there is date or time disagreement, we
search the PR Newswire, Business Wire and Wall Street Horizon in LexisNexis to identify
16
the correct date and/or time. If the LexisNexis search is unsuccessful, either because there
are no news items or we cannot identify the timing, we record the announcement as missing.
Our sample is restricted by OptionMetrics data availability (1/1996 until 8/2015) and
Thomson Reuters (first full calendar year is 2000). IBES and Compustat provide longer
data histories. Since the exact announcement time is crucial for our analysis (and because of
issues with IBES), we restrict the sample from 1/2000- 8/2015.7 After applying the filters,
we select the 50 most liquid firms each year. Our liquidity-driven sample selection is similar
to Carr and Wu (2009) and Bakshi et al. (2012), although we apply our criteria year by
year rather than to the full sample, avoiding potential biases due to delistings (such as Dell),
default (such as Lehman), merger activity (such as Chase Manhattan and J.P. Morgan) or
IPOs (such as Google). A range of highly liquid firms remain in the sample throughout
the entire 16 year period: Amazon (ticker: AMZN), General Electric (GE), Intel (INTC),
International Business Machines (IBM), Microsoft (MSFT) and Qualcomm (QCOM). On
the other hand, many of the overall 196 firms pass the selection criteria in few years.
We obtain option information for all available contracts. IVs are based on best bid
and offer price midpoints and are adjusted for dividends and early exercise. We eliminate
strike/maturity combinations with zero volume, zero IV, or maturities more than one year.
We next eliminate options with less than three days to maturity, as microstructure issues are
magnified with extremely short-dated options. For every day and expiration date, options
are sorted by moneyness, and we record IVs for the nearest to-the-money strike. We define
moneyness as M ≡ K/Ft,T where K is the strike and Ft,T the time t forward price with time
to maturity T .8 ATM options are most actively traded and provide the cleanest information
on expected volatility. For each strike/maturity, call and put IVs need not be identical, due
7Removing the first four years from our sample has no effect on our results. An earlier version of this
paper included options from this sub-period and found qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
8We calculate forward prices using the dividend information in OptionMetrics as well as the zero curve
file which provides risk-free rates.
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to the American feature, microstructure noise such as bid-ask spreads or stale quotes. Since
OptionMetrics reports close prices, stale quotes are a concern. Battalio and Schultz (2006)
argue that stale option quotes bias put-call parity tests. To minimize this, we average call
and put IVs for the closest to-the-money strike for a given maturity.9 If call and put IV
differences are extreme, we eliminate the option pair from our dataset.
Table 1 (Panel A) shows that there is increased trading around earnings announcements.
The average daily dollar volume is about twice as high on the first trading day after earn-
ings announcement compared to ordinary trading days within a 40 day window around the
announcements. These patterns are robust across sub-samples, although the overall trading
in equity options has increased markedly over time. Panel B shows that there is a slightly
higher bid-ask spread on the day after earnings announcements, but the economic differences
are rather small. For instance, pooled average bid-ask spreads for ATM options are 6.17%
on EADs versus 6.05% over the period from 11 to 20 trading days after the announcement.
Note that quoted bid-ask spreads are a very rough measure of trading cost, Muravyev and
Pearson (2016) show that real trading costs in option markets may be substantially lower.
9To see how this mitigates the stale quote problem, consider an example. Consider an ATM call and put
option with T − t = 1/12, St = $20, σ = 20% and rt = 5%). The call and put prices are $0.5024 and $0.4193.
If we assume that option quotes do not change (they are priced assuming the equity price is $20) and that
the closing equity price is actually $20.10, the IVs are not 20%, but 22.28 for the call and 17.918 for the
put, generating problems put-call parity tests, such as those in Battalio and Schultz (2006). Our averaging
procedure generates an IV of 20.09 percent, close to the true IV. In practice, averaging also reduces problems
with bid-ask spreads. Pan and Poteshman (2006) use a similar procedure. Another possibility would be
to employ intradaily option data in our analysis which is now available for part of our sample period from
various data vendors. Due to the extreme computational burden of intra-daily option data (see Muravyev
et al. (2013)) and the benchmark character of OptionMetrics in the related literature, we focus on daily
closing prices.
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Table 1: Average Dollar Volume and Bid-Ask Spreads around Earnings Announce-
ments.
Panel A provides the average daily dollar trading volume (mid dollar price of option contract times traded
volume) averaged over all firms in our sample and over trading days prior and after earnings announcements.
Column 2 (-20 to -10) provides the average trading volume 20 to 10 trading days before the announcements.
Column 5 (0) is the volume on the day prior to the announcement, column 6 (1) is the volume on the first
day after the announcement (i.e. the day after the announcement for an AMC announcement and the same
day for a BMO announcement). Other columns follow identical patterns. Panel B provides average bid-ask
spreads for option with strikes between 95% and 105% of the current stock price (we divide by the mid
dollar price of the option).
Days re-
altive to
EA
-20 to
-10
-9 to -5 -4 to -1 0 1 2 to 5 6 to 10 11 to 20
Panel A: Average Dollar Volume (in 100 Million USD)
2000 - 2005 10.26 9.66 10.74 12.99 17.84 9.92 8.42 9.76
2006 - 2010 19.84 23.82 20.36 36.41 42.92 22.42 21.82 20.34
2011 - 2015 22.56 29.96 27.70 46.66 65.79 26.84 36.05 32.38
Pooled 17.07 20.37 18.99 30.74 40.48 19.07 21.14 20.04
Panel B: Average Bid-Ask Spread for ATM options (in Percentage of the Mid Option Price)
2000 - 2005 5.27 5.50 5.50 4.86 5.64 5.36 5.32 5.79
2006 - 2010 4.82 4.99 4.92 5.04 5.26 4.83 4.84 5.11
2011 - 2015 7.11 6.65 6.02 6.28 7.71 7.00 7.16 7.30
Pooled 5.70 5.70 5.47 5.37 6.17 5.70 5.75 6.05
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4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides equity return statistics for firms with at least 7 years of EADs pooled by
year. EAD return volatility is substantially higher than non-EAD volatility as variance ratios
are close to six on average. The effect varies across firms and the business cycle, indicating
strong heterogeneity in the pricing of earnings news. For example, our results imply that in
2015 more than 19% of the total annualized variance of individual equity returns occurred on
EADs.10 EAD volatilities are significantly higher during the 2000-2001 recession and in 2008.
In 2008, due to the higher level of diffusive volatility, a similar calculation shows that total
EAD variance drops to 6.2% of total variance, consistent with a greater role for non-firm
specific systematic macroeconomic volatility. If volatility was constant across days, EADs
would generate 4/252 ≈ 1.6% of the total annualized variance. Earnings announcements
generate a large, disproportionate share of overall volatility, with a time-varying impact.
Table 3 disaggregates the data at the firm level. Note first that the number of EADs
varies as firms enter and exit the sample based on trading volumes. There is a wide range of
firms in terms of the relative importance of EADs. For example, NFLX has a variance ratio
of 47.32, indicative of a relatively large amount of information on EADs. Presumably for
firms like NFLX, it is difficult to obtain valuation relevant information like subscribers or
revenue from public sources. For other firms, such as COP, CVX, FCX, or XOM, earnings
announcements provide little information as these firms’ earnings are driven by publicly
available information like commodity prices. Altria’s (the former Phillip Morris) earnings
announcements have little impact – not surprising given that this firm was involved in decades
10For example, in 2015, dividing the variance on EADs, 4 × 7.412, by the total non EAD variance, 4 ×
7.412 + 248× 1.932 is 19.37%.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the underlying returns (pooled)
This table provides summary statistics for daily percentage equity returns for all firms in our sample
from January 2000 until August 2015, pooled by calendar year. Summary statistics are provided for
earnings announcement dates and trading days without earnings announcements. We report volatility
(Vol), skewness (Skew) and kurtosis (Kurt) as well as the ratio (Var Ratio) between EAD and non EAD
variance. The last column provides the number of EADs in our sample.
Ticker
EAD
Vol
NonEAD
Vol
Var
Ratio
EAD
Skew
Non
EAD
Skew
EAD
Kurt
Non
EAD
Kurt
Num
EAD
2000 9.60 5.80 2.74 0.47 0.53 3.10 7.49 190
2001 9.63 5.37 3.22 0.01 0.50 4.34 7.66 193
2002 7.13 3.38 4.44 0.23 -0.25 5.90 11.58 192
2003 5.43 2.13 6.46 0.67 1.03 5.15 21.53 196
2004 7.24 2.49 8.45 -0.87 16.08 10.66 833.01 192
2005 5.18 1.91 7.34 0.37 -0.39 6.66 41.93 199
2006 6.21 1.80 11.89 -0.61 0.48 5.27 10.16 197
2007 7.13 2.19 10.57 1.24 0.48 12.42 12.44 192
2008 9.38 4.62 4.12 -0.14 0.85 6.91 19.47 197
2009 7.23 3.01 5.75 0.92 0.63 6.20 12.76 193
2010 5.41 1.88 8.33 0.90 0.44 7.15 10.63 200
2011 6.82 2.28 8.90 -1.45 0.25 10.95 18.55 200
2012 7.65 1.80 18.13 -0.75 0.41 12.53 13.15 200
2013 7.70 1.76 19.15 1.32 1.57 8.35 45.64 199
2014 5.98 1.75 11.70 0.36 -0.01 6.28 12.18 197
2015 7.41 1.93 14.76 -0.45 0.45 5.42 19.53 150
Pooled 7.32 3.06 5.71 0.15 1.18 7.83 44.03 3087
long tobacco litigation and the firm provides frequent corporate updates on non-EADs, thus
earnings announcements have little content. Overall, there is substantial cross-sectional and
times series variation in the impact of valuation relevant information released on EADs.
The model in Equation 2 assumes conditionally normally distributed returns, but since
volatility changes across EADs, returns are not unconditionally normal, consistent with the
data. Non-EADs generally have greater non-normality than EADs, consistent with SV and
non-EAD price jumps. If random jumps are present, the low skewness indicates near zero
jump means, thus Merton (1976) implies that these types of jumps will not adversely impact
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the underlying returns (by firm)
This table provides summary statistics for daily percentage equity returns for all firms with at least seven
years of EAD data from January 2000 until August 2015. Summary statistics are provided for earnings
announcement dates and for trading days without earnings announcements. We report volatility (Vol),
skewness (Skew) and kurtosis (Kurt) as well as the ratio (Var Ratio) between EAD and non EAD variance.
The last column provides the number of EADs in our sample.
Ticker
EAD
Vol
NonEAD
Vol
Var
Ratio
EAD
Skew
Non
EAD
Skew
EAD
Kurt
Non
EAD
Kurt
Num
EAD
AAPL 6.12 2.55 5.77 -0.27 -2.65 2.31 60.55 51
AIG 3.73 1.93 3.73 -0.86 0.61 3.26 12.22 36
AMGN 5.59 2.34 5.74 0.44 0.41 3.70 7.23 40
AMZN 12.41 3.28 14.34 0.26 1.18 2.37 16.24 63
BA 3.67 1.99 3.41 -0.19 0.30 2.34 8.05 27
BAC 4.93 2.30 4.58 -2.61 0.91 15.50 27.15 51
C 3.26 1.81 3.24 0.74 -0.08 6.32 8.07 47
CAT 4.96 1.96 6.40 -0.42 0.24 3.06 8.49 46
COP 2.69 2.17 1.53 -1.05 -0.13 5.34 9.30 28
CSCO 7.71 2.51 9.42 0.62 0.54 3.78 10.98 60
CVX 1.74 1.74 1.00 -0.47 0.57 2.90 19.39 36
DELL 6.87 2.68 6.58 -0.14 0.46 3.26 7.75 28
EBAY 7.96 3.53 5.09 -0.06 0.77 3.54 12.02 30
FCX 4.10 3.22 1.63 -0.31 0.13 3.42 10.51 43
FSLR 16.41 4.24 14.95 0.52 0.79 1.89 13.91 27
GE 4.06 1.94 4.39 -0.10 0.45 5.30 12.09 63
GOOGL 7.19 1.77 16.52 0.41 0.14 2.67 8.56 43
GS 4.02 2.19 3.37 2.11 0.81 8.51 21.13 55
IBM 5.22 1.58 10.90 0.19 0.19 3.76 8.11 63
INTC 5.97 2.38 6.29 0.13 -0.13 5.08 9.06 62
JNJ 1.74 1.18 2.18 0.15 -0.93 1.99 19.97 36
JPM 3.60 2.62 1.89 0.97 0.88 4.74 18.53 59
MA 7.13 2.29 9.72 0.59 0.27 2.81 10.47 27
MO 1.77 1.63 1.17 0.05 0.28 2.87 14.63 44
MRK 3.17 1.65 3.70 -0.12 -1.67 2.74 37.20 40
MS 5.97 3.74 2.54 -2.05 6.38 9.43 158.41 31
MSFT 5.99 1.88 10.15 0.23 0.28 4.21 10.29 62
NEM 3.69 2.11 3.07 0.26 0.08 2.87 4.59 28
NFLX 20.91 3.04 47.32 -0.15 0.37 2.17 6.54 27
PFE 3.38 1.49 5.11 -1.04 -0.01 4.73 7.33 47
PG 3.12 1.38 5.14 -0.60 -3.64 2.90 93.59 52
QCOM 6.19 2.72 5.17 -0.23 0.30 3.43 8.82 63
SHLD 8.96 3.03 8.72 0.36 1.12 2.62 11.13 27
T 2.42 1.43 2.86 -0.40 0.98 3.96 17.54 35
UPS 2.57 1.26 4.14 0.43 0.20 2.89 8.40 28
VZ 2.58 1.46 3.10 1.29 -0.09 5.30 8.08 36
WFC 8.63 3.21 7.22 2.85 1.06 10.69 19.65 31
WMT 2.65 1.35 3.84 0.29 0.34 2.39 8.36 51
X 5.14 3.82 1.81 0.25 -0.09 2.26 6.44 27
XOM 2.21 1.57 1.98 -1.10 0.42 4.76 16.79 51
YHOO 8.90 3.28 7.34 -0.11 1.13 2.86 23.20 47
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our estimators that use ATM options.
To economize on space, Appendix A.3 reports tests of the assumption that earnings
announcements induce a jump or discontinuity in economic trading time. The volatility
of close-to-open returns on EADs is more than three times higher than on non-EAD days,
indicating that EADs are outliers or “abnormally” large movements. The volatility of open-
to-close returns is only slightly higher for EADs, consistent with the presence of jumps
induced by earnings announcements, full digestion by market open as in (see Martineau
(2017)), and inconsistent with a continuous sample path (as in Patell and Wolfson (1979)
and Patell and Wolfson (1981)).
4.2 Nonparametric Tests
This section tests the three main implications of earnings announcements on option prices:
(1) IV increases prior to an EAD; (2) the term structure of IV is downward sloping before
the EAD; and (3) IV decreases after the announcement.
The first tests use the Fisher sign and the Wilcoxon signed rank nonparametric tests to
evaluate if a data series is positive or negative. Under the null that EADs have no impact,
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test assumes the distribution is symmetric around zero, while
the Fisher test assumes a zero median. For both, for example, the shape (normal versus
t-distribution) and variance could change over time. We use one-sided tests to examine IV
increases or decreases. PW (1979, 1981) use the same tests, although our implementation
differs because we use changes in variance (as opposed to volatility), as this is the main
model implication.11 The time series tests compare IV changes for the shortest maturity
options with at least three days to maturity post announcement. To test the IV increase
11The Fisher test gives the same result using either volatilities or variances, as it only depends on signs
and is invariant to monotonic transformations.
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pre-announcement, we subtract the ATM IV one trading day before the announcement from
the ATM IV two weeks prior to the announcement.12 Our results are not sensitive to these
choices and are similar if we use the IV change over one week or increase the minimum
time-to-maturity constraint. For the decrease in IV, we use the one day change around the
EAD. If data are missing for the shortest maturity, we move one day in either direction. For
the term structure tests, we use ATM options for the first two available maturities.
To economize on space, we summarize the findings and report detailed results in Tables
A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A.4. The term structure and post EAD decrease implications holds
for all years, while the increase in IV prior to EADs holds for every year except for 2009 when
the Fisher test is insignificant. 2009 marked the end of the crisis, market and firm volatilities
fell dramatically, and volatility of volatility was quite high.13 At the firm level, the null of
no post EAD decrease is rejected for every firm. These rejections provide strong evidence
given our modest sample sizes (between 27 and 63 earnings dates per firm), supporting our
reduced-form model and the importance of EADs. The term-structure evidence is also strong
at the firm level, with only one exception (Altria, ticker MO), which was discussed above.
The fact that IVs sometimes fall in the two weeks prior to an EAD is not surprising, given
that volatility of two week changes is large (further evidence is provided in Appendix A.5).
For example, for many firms, a large decrease in market volatility leading into a firm’s EAD
would likely be sufficient to generate an overall decrease in IV. Despite the small sample
size, even for this test we reject the null of no effect for the vast majority of firms. Not
surprisingly, the firms with the weakest evidence also had the smallest increases in return
volatility on EADs. Appendix A.6 discusses the impact of SV on these results.
12We are careful to ensure that both IVs are calculated from options with the same maturity date.
13The VIX index fell from approximately 50% to 20% by the of 2009.
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4.3 Characterizing Anticipated Earnings Volatility
Tables 4 and 6 provide firm-level summaries of the term structure and time series estimates
of σQj given in Equations (4) and (5). We average these estimators in volatility units which is
conservative due to Jensen’s inequality.14 Earnings announcement volatilities are large and
statistically significant. Across firms, the average term-structure estimate is 6.87% and for
nearly all firms the mean is greater than the median, indicating positive skewness. These
ex-ante earnings risks can be extremely high: for Amazon.com (AMZN), for instance, a
historical three standard deviation confidence band for the EAD return is ±36%. Thus, very
large moves around EADs are clearly priced in options. Our estimates can easily generate
the spikes in Figure 1.15 Earnings volatility estimates also vary substantially across firms.
For example, earnings volatility for AMZN, FSLR and NFLX average over 10%, while other
firms average less than 3%.
Table 4 also reports error dates. The column labeled Err1 counts the number of EADs
for which σt,T1 < σt,T2 . A small number of error dates are not surprising for the reasons
already discussed. First, error dates are concentrated in firms with low earning announce-
ment volatility. Many of the largest and most actively traded firms have no error dates at
all, suggesting microstructure or liquidity issues as possible causes. Second, the magnitudes
of errors are quite small. There are only two dates on which σt,T2 − σt,T1 > 5%. As a
comparison, option bid-ask spreads for the maturities we use are around 5%, in terms of
IV. This is especially relevant for firms with low earnings volatility (such as BAC, C, CVX,
JNJ, JPM, MO, MRK, or XOM), as the differences in IVs for options on these firms are
14Jensen’s inequality implies that the average of the standard deviations is less than the square root of
the average variances since
(
N−1
∑N
j=1 σj
)2
< N−1
∑N
j=1 σ
2
j .
15Consider the following example. Assume the annualized diffusive volatility is constant at 40%, which
implies that daily diffusive volatility is about 2.5% (0.40/
√
252). If the anticipated earnings uncertainty is
10%, then the annualized IV of an ATM option expiring in one-week is about 92% prior to the announcement
and then subsequently falls to 40%.
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Table 4: Anticipated uncertainty (term structure estimator, by firm)
This table provides the average estimate of anticipated uncertainty σQj using the term-structure estimator
σQterm. We report the summary statistics over the sample period from January 2000 until August 2015
for all firms with at least seven years of EAD data. We report the mean, (Mean), median (Median), the
standard error (Std Error), and the lower and upper quartile (25% and 75%) of all observations without
errors. Err1 counts the number of EAD on which the hypothesis of a decreasing term structure is violated,
Err2 counts the number of EAD on which the violations were more than 5% (i.e. σt,T2 − σt,T1 > 0.05). The
last column provides the number of observations (Obs).
Term Mean Median
Std
Error
25% 75% Err1 Err2 Obs
AAPL 8.83 8.49 0.40 7.08 9.76 0 0 51
AIG 5.21 5.07 0.52 3.03 5.98 4 0 36
AMGN 5.46 4.79 0.47 3.60 6.64 4 0 40
AMZN 12.06 11.06 0.49 9.49 13.94 0 0 63
BA 4.33 4.09 0.29 3.35 5.01 2 0 27
BAC 3.96 3.31 0.47 2.28 4.69 5 0 51
C 3.34 2.90 0.21 2.29 4.48 8 0 47
CAT 5.67 5.07 0.38 4.31 6.13 0 0 46
COP 3.33 2.89 0.49 1.72 4.11 4 0 28
CSCO 8.13 7.28 0.35 6.59 9.10 0 0 60
CVX 2.53 2.52 0.19 1.85 2.94 11 0 36
DELL 6.25 5.90 0.51 4.53 7.06 4 0 28
EBAY 8.36 8.48 0.57 6.74 10.20 0 0 30
FCX 5.26 4.95 0.40 3.36 6.38 4 0 43
FSLR 14.13 14.17 0.67 11.14 16.02 1 1 27
GE 4.17 3.48 0.37 2.75 4.10 4 0 63
GOOGL 7.94 7.60 0.45 6.22 9.33 0 0 43
GS 4.98 4.00 0.41 3.17 5.93 6 1 55
IBM 5.68 5.02 0.30 4.49 6.15 0 0 63
INTC 7.04 6.27 0.36 5.31 7.66 1 0 62
JNJ 2.56 2.25 0.21 1.72 3.05 5 0 36
JPM 4.62 3.80 0.37 2.95 5.25 4 0 59
MA 6.90 6.14 0.53 4.76 8.58 0 0 27
MO 2.71 2.60 0.26 1.85 3.22 22 0 44
MRK 2.90 2.80 0.25 1.77 3.98 10 0 40
MS 6.39 4.36 0.86 3.24 7.69 5 0 31
MSFT 5.35 5.03 0.29 3.96 6.04 2 0 62
NEM 3.39 3.67 0.39 2.11 4.62 7 0 28
NFLX 14.92 13.98 0.91 11.25 18.39 0 0 27
PFE 2.99 3.21 0.18 2.16 3.73 6 0 47
PG 3.45 2.91 0.27 2.34 4.08 2 0 52
QCOM 6.78 6.15 0.32 5.35 7.53 1 0 63
SHLD 7.76 7.86 0.55 5.20 8.84 0 0 27
T 3.40 2.79 0.42 2.27 3.80 6 0 35
UPS 3.53 3.38 0.45 2.14 4.25 4 0 28
VZ 2.95 2.84 0.28 1.95 3.74 7 0 36
WFC 5.90 3.86 1.06 3.10 5.34 0 0 31
WMT 3.26 3.30 0.15 2.60 3.57 3 0 51
X 6.75 6.44 0.61 5.64 7.68 2 0 27
XOM 2.50 2.28 0.21 1.80 3.20 11 0 51
YHOO 9.96 8.87 0.62 7.09 10.33 1 0 47
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Table 5: Anticipated uncertainty (term structure estimator, by calendar year)
This table provides the average estimate of anticipated uncertainty σQj using the term-structure estimator
σQterm. We report the summary statistics over the sample period from January 2000 until August 2015 for all
firms in the sample and pool the results by calendar year. We report the mean, (Mean), median (Median),
the standard error (Std Error), and the lower and upper quartile (25% and 75%) of all observations without
errors. Err1 counts the number of EAD on which the hypothesis of a decreasing term structure is violated,
Err2 counts the number of EAD on which the violations were more than 5% (i.e. σt,T2 − σt,T1 > 0.05). The
last column provides the number of observations (Obs).
Term Mean Median
Std
Error
25% 75% Err1 Err2 Obs
2000 10.51 9.55 0.41 6.66 14.53 9 2 185
2001 10.91 10.76 0.45 6.13 14.78 13 0 190
2002 7.19 5.61 0.38 3.53 9.96 20 2 187
2003 4.90 4.78 0.18 2.90 6.53 31 2 194
2004 5.37 4.63 0.27 2.74 7.15 38 3 192
2005 5.13 4.47 0.24 2.81 6.88 30 1 195
2006 5.70 5.00 0.23 3.43 6.99 11 0 194
2007 5.95 5.21 0.25 3.49 7.37 16 0 189
2008 10.05 9.02 0.38 6.21 13.46 4 1 189
2009 7.01 6.18 0.34 3.96 9.37 12 0 188
2010 5.05 4.53 0.24 2.88 6.21 25 0 200
2011 6.16 5.11 0.31 2.83 8.11 15 1 200
2012 6.26 4.41 0.38 2.89 7.07 13 0 197
2013 6.83 5.13 0.33 3.60 8.86 3 0 198
2014 6.46 4.97 0.31 3.75 7.93 2 0 197
2015 5.93 4.99 0.29 3.32 7.82 3 1 149
Pooled 6.87 5.55 0.09 3.48 9.06 245 13 3008
smaller. Appendix A.5 provides further evidence on the errors and these results suggest that
the majority of errors in the term structure estimator are driven by a combination of low
earnings volatility, microstructure and/or data issues (e.g., stale quotes).
There is interesting time series variation in the earnings volatility estimates, summarized
in Table 5. Earnings uncertainty was highest in recessions, 2000–2002 and 2008–2009, and
was significantly lower in expansions. The magnitude of the effect is substantial: the average
in 2000–2002 was more than double the average in tranquil years. This is consistent with
higher earnings volatility, but also with an increase in the sensitivity of equity prices to
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earnings shocks (via a higher β in an earnings response model). These results complement
Campbell et al. (2001) who show that both market and idiosyncratic volatility increase
during periods of recession and Herskovic et al. (2016) who document a high degree of
commonality in idiosyncratic volatility. Bloom (2009) finds that stock market volatility is
strongly correlated with the cross-sectional spread of firm-level profit growth, our results
imply that cross-sectional earnings uncertainty dispersion also increases in recessions. It
is hard to identify these patterns in EA volatility using only realized equity returns and
earnings, given there is only one noisy quarterly observation. Higher earnings volatility
during recessions may also be related to leverage (e.g., Christie (1982)). In the compound
pricing model of Geske (1979) equity volatility increases as the ratio of market value of debt
to equity increases during recession. Similarly, if earnings announcements lead to jumps
in the market value of the firm, EA volatility does increase with higher leverage. This is
particularly true for firms with short-term maturity debt.16
Table 6 summarizes results for the time series estimator. The results are quantitatively
and qualitatively similar to the term structure estimates. The average estimate is 6.04%,
compared to 6.87% for the term structure estimator. As discussed earlier and in the Ap-
pendix, the time series estimator is likely to be downward biased relative to the term structure
estimator. The two estimators do capture the quantitatively the same effect: the correlation
between the time-series and term-structure estimates across firms is 93%.17 To decompose
the correlations further, column Corr in Table 6 provides the within firm, across time corre-
lation between the term structure and time series estimates, conditional on both estimates
being positive. These correlations are also high with a pooled Spearman coefficient of 82%.
These findings provide strong evidence that the estimators are capturing a common effect,
16Geske et al. (2016) study the compound option model empirically, finding support for the impact of
leverage on option prices.
17We use Spearman’s rho to be robust with respect to outliers in the data. Results for Pearson’s correlation
are similar.
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Table 6: Anticipated uncertainty (time series estimator, by firm)
This table provides anticipated uncertainty, σQj , estimates using the time-series estimator σ
Q
term. We report
summary statistics over the sample period from 1/2000-8/2015 for all firms with at least seven years of
EAD data. We report the mean, (Mean), median (Median), the standard error (Std Error), and the lower
and upper quartile (25% and 75%) of all observations without errors. Err1 counts the number of EAD on
which the hypothesis of a decreasing implied volatility after the announcement is violated, Err2 counts the
number of EAD on which the violations were more than 5% (i.e. στj+1/252,T−1/252 − στj−,T > 0.05). The
column Corr provides rank correlations between the term-structure and time-series estimators of Table 4,
the column No Data counts the number of EAD on which we cannot calculate the estimator due to missing
option data. The last column provides the number of observations (Obs).
Time Mean Median
Std
Error
25% 75% Err1 Err2 Corr
No
Data
Obs
AAPL 8.16 7.54 0.39 6.07 9.46 1 0 82.67 0 51
AIG 4.31 3.44 0.41 2.68 5.44 4 0 83.05 0 36
AMGN 4.73 4.20 0.38 3.35 6.11 1 0 49.13 1 40
AMZN 10.97 10.31 0.45 8.59 12.86 2 1 77.87 0 63
BA 3.74 3.66 0.29 2.86 4.62 5 0 9.71 0 27
BAC 3.29 2.68 0.33 1.87 4.14 12 2 28.07 0 51
C 2.43 2.23 0.15 1.70 2.91 13 2 33.63 0 47
CAT 4.97 4.22 0.34 3.74 5.56 2 0 66.41 0 46
COP 2.97 3.03 0.25 2.21 3.67 5 0 32.02 0 28
CSCO 7.58 7.29 0.34 5.97 8.34 1 0 77.07 0 60
CVX 2.06 1.95 0.17 1.43 2.39 10 0 41.42 0 36
DELL 6.14 6.28 0.28 5.40 7.08 2 1 21.35 0 28
EBAY 7.52 7.34 0.53 5.53 9.17 0 0 70.19 0 30
FCX 4.35 4.28 0.34 2.88 4.95 2 1 44.81 0 43
FSLR 12.90 13.03 0.69 10.03 14.85 1 1 83.39 0 27
GE 3.89 3.19 0.40 2.56 3.97 10 0 56.37 0 63
GOOGL 7.05 6.75 0.45 5.42 7.88 1 1 81.77 0 43
GS 4.30 3.45 0.35 2.76 5.15 2 0 69.39 0 55
IBM 5.18 4.60 0.21 4.31 5.53 1 0 73.31 0 63
INTC 6.17 5.69 0.28 4.81 6.73 2 0 66.51 0 62
JNJ 2.20 1.99 0.16 1.62 2.68 5 0 14.70 0 36
JPM 3.52 3.27 0.23 2.47 4.06 5 0 34.59 0 59
MA 5.83 5.39 0.51 4.02 8.04 1 0 87.67 0 27
MO 2.54 2.04 0.28 1.72 2.97 7 1 16.69 0 44
MRK 2.66 2.49 0.20 2.00 3.12 6 0 31.16 0 40
MS 4.42 3.90 0.53 2.97 5.11 5 2 29.25 1 31
MSFT 5.01 4.61 0.24 3.97 5.76 3 2 75.25 0 62
NEM 2.91 2.82 0.31 1.86 3.75 5 0 57.68 0 28
NFLX 12.91 12.24 0.86 9.99 16.73 1 1 81.20 0 27
PFE 2.74 2.99 0.16 1.96 3.41 8 2 22.32 0 47
PG 2.71 2.50 0.19 2.01 3.25 5 0 24.38 0 52
QCOM 6.79 6.09 0.40 5.13 7.40 2 0 68.38 1 63
SHLD 6.46 6.05 0.50 5.26 8.39 0 0 59.12 10 27
T 2.99 2.57 0.29 1.99 3.34 3 0 38.96 0 35
UPS 3.33 2.82 0.37 2.21 4.18 4 0 79.00 1 28
VZ 2.83 2.39 0.22 2.06 3.19 1 0 42.99 0 36
WFC 4.27 3.52 0.67 2.88 4.50 2 1 48.23 0 31
WMT 2.82 2.72 0.18 2.31 3.31 7 0 54.13 0 51
X 5.84 5.67 0.68 4.16 7.07 5 1 34.22 0 27
XOM 2.09 2.06 0.14 1.52 2.56 8 0 29.08 0 51
YHOO 8.71 7.70 0.62 6.02 10.37 1 0 62.12 0 47
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both across firms and over time.
In terms of reliability, there are more error dates for the time series estimator, as expected
from the discussion above. To see this, note first from the error columns in Table 6, there
are more dates on which σt,T1 is substantially lower than σt+∆,T1−∆ (where ∆ is one trading
day). Second, there are more dates on which we are unable to find pre/post EAD IVs for the
same maturity, though these were concentrated in the beginning of the sample. Appendix
A.3 and A.5 documents that firms with very high volatility or very low earnings volatility
have noisier time series estimates. In what remains, we use only the more reliable and fully
ex-ante term structure estimates.
4.4 Predictive Content of Anticipated Uncertainty
The next step is to understand the informational content of the ex-ante earnings price volatil-
ity measures. A large literature, cited earlier, finds that for individual firms, indices, cur-
rencies and other macroeconomic markets, option IV predicts subsequent realized return
volatility, typically tested over horizons such as monthly. Our earnings jump volatilities
correspond to shorter time horizons – daily or even overnight – for which it is more difficult
to identify realized volatility predictors and the sampling problems are more severe.
Empirically, high Q-Vol firms have high realized EAD volatility: the cross-sectional cor-
relation between average EAD Q and P-Vol is 85%. At the firm level, the time series
correlation between the absolute EAD return |rj| (where rj is the return from the close prior
to the announcement to the first close after the announcement), and σQj (calculated using
all available EADs for a given firm) is positive for all but three firms (see Table 7) with a
highly significant averaged correlation of 53%. To understand the statistical properties of
these results, suppose that log
(
σQj
) ∼ N (2, (0.25)2), which generates an average anticipated
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Table 7: Predictive content of anticipated uncertainty
This table provides correlations between anticipated uncertainty and the subsequent equity market return
volatility for all firms with at least seven years of EAD data. EAD Return abs provides Pearson correlation
coefficients and rank correlations and their corresponding p-values between σQj and the absolute return on
the EAD. EAD Return squared provides the same statistics for the correlation between
(
σQj
)2
and the
squared return on the EAD.
Firm EAD Return abs EAD Return squared
Corr p-val RankCorr p-val Corr p-val RankCorr p-val
AAPL 23.73 0.09 28.50 0.04 16.06 0.26 28.50 0.04
AIG 27.21 0.13 20.19 0.26 29.16 0.10 20.19 0.26
AMGN 56.14 0.00 44.50 0.01 54.81 0.00 44.50 0.01
AMZN -2.09 0.87 3.61 0.78 -2.62 0.84 3.61 0.78
BA 25.48 0.22 13.92 0.51 35.83 0.08 13.92 0.51
BAC 89.40 0.00 59.82 0.00 98.52 0.00 59.82 0.00
C 34.15 0.03 33.51 0.03 39.66 0.01 33.51 0.03
CAT 13.46 0.37 13.60 0.37 6.45 0.67 13.60 0.37
COP 70.21 0.00 10.26 0.63 91.38 0.00 10.26 0.63
CSCO 23.64 0.07 10.92 0.41 26.29 0.04 10.92 0.41
CVX 0.05 1.00 -0.92 0.97 -3.88 0.85 -0.92 0.97
DELL 50.49 0.01 29.89 0.12 68.33 0.00 29.89 0.12
EBAY -0.13 0.99 2.47 0.90 0.98 0.96 2.47 0.90
FCX 57.47 0.00 27.80 0.08 71.34 0.00 27.80 0.08
FSLR -3.99 0.85 -0.03 1.00 -2.67 0.90 -0.03 1.00
GE 44.89 0.00 31.53 0.02 54.51 0.00 31.53 0.02
GOOGL -2.40 0.88 -1.43 0.93 -3.73 0.81 -1.43 0.93
GS 54.79 0.00 23.58 0.09 69.45 0.00 23.58 0.09
IBM 31.46 0.01 17.88 0.16 36.23 0.00 17.88 0.16
INTC 32.03 0.01 28.20 0.03 23.71 0.06 28.20 0.03
JNJ 34.14 0.05 39.21 0.02 31.03 0.07 39.21 0.02
JPM 41.18 0.00 37.74 0.00 36.63 0.01 37.74 0.00
MA 64.01 0.00 50.67 0.01 70.71 0.00 50.67 0.01
MO 46.23 0.02 44.00 0.03 42.90 0.03 44.00 0.03
MRK 14.92 0.41 16.01 0.37 12.93 0.47 16.01 0.37
MS 28.57 0.14 11.99 0.54 27.72 0.15 11.99 0.54
MSFT 4.93 0.70 -10.40 0.42 25.52 0.05 -10.40 0.42
NEM 52.89 0.02 59.85 0.01 36.82 0.11 59.85 0.01
NFLX 13.01 0.52 2.38 0.91 16.26 0.42 2.38 0.91
PFE 4.15 0.79 -13.85 0.38 11.00 0.49 -13.85 0.38
PG 57.46 0.00 50.56 0.00 55.04 0.00 50.56 0.00
QCOM 17.53 0.18 5.69 0.66 25.96 0.04 5.69 0.66
SHLD 42.61 0.05 50.31 0.02 35.10 0.11 50.31 0.02
T 62.41 0.00 34.68 0.06 78.87 0.00 34.68 0.06
UPS 47.40 0.02 36.77 0.07 47.94 0.02 36.77 0.07
VZ 6.50 0.74 7.64 0.69 1.83 0.93 7.64 0.69
WFC 75.13 0.00 45.48 0.01 74.11 0.00 45.48 0.01
WMT 18.03 0.22 7.98 0.58 23.11 0.11 7.98 0.58
X -0.38 0.99 10.35 0.63 -5.45 0.80 10.35 0.63
XOM 18.26 0.26 17.47 0.28 12.26 0.45 17.47 0.28
YHOO 39.28 0.01 23.80 0.11 38.73 0.01 23.80 0.11
Pooled 54.88 0.00 53.45 0.00 43.34 0.00 53.45 0.00
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Table 8: Predictive content of option implied diffusive and EAD jump volatility (pooled
regression)
This table provides results for cross-sectional regressions of EAD volatility variables on σQj , diffusive equity
volatility calculated from option prices and the standard deviation of EPS analyst forecasts (as reported in
IBES) normalized by the equity price. We report regression coefficients for a range of different regression
specifications and provide corresponding t-statistics in parentheses (we cluster standard errors by quarter
and firm). Panel A provides regression results using the absolute EAD return as dependent variable,
whereas Panel B uses the one-month equity volatility calculated from daily returns. Each observation
corresponds to a unique earnings announcement, i.e. a unique firm-quarter observation.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Panel A – Dependent variable: absolute EAD return (close-to-close)
Constant 0.01 (3.69) 0.05 (13.66) 0.02 (4.09) 0.01 (1.85)
EAD Jump Volatility 0.58 (11.42) 0.50 (7.02)
IBES Disagreement 0.82 (1.15) -0.45 (-0.72)
Diffusive Volatility 0.09 (11.73) 0.03 (4.31)
R2 (%) 28.47 0.17 15.28 29.68
Panel B – Dependent variable: one-month standard deviation after EAD
Constant 0.01 (9.74) 0.02 (12.72) 0.00 (2.30) 0.00 (0.30)
EAD Jump Volatility 0.26 (16.57) 0.12 (11.44)
IBES Disagreement 1.05 (3.42) 0.12 (0.96)
Diffusive Volatility 0.06 (16.98) 0.05 (16.24)
R2 (%) 45.99 2.31 65.80 73.46
uncertainty of about 7.4%, and that rj ∼ N
(
0,
(
σQj
)2)
. Then, the population correlation
between |rj| and σQj is about 30% and a 95% confidence interval is (0.01,0.57) for samples
of our size. The range of values in Table 7 is entirely consistent with the model and normal
sampling noise. Overall, our option-based EAD volatility estimators provide accurate and
significant forecasts of the earnings announcement impact on equity prices.
Table 8 formalizes these results via cross-sectional regressions of absolute announcement
day returns (close-to-close) on various variables. Panel A focuses on option-implied EAD
jump volatility, diffusive volatility (also extracted from option prices) and the standard
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deviation of IBES EPS forecasts. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and others, the
IBES analyst earnings uncertainty variable is constructed by standardizing EPS forecast
volatility by the equity price ten days prior to the EAD. Results are based on all firm/quarter
observations with a minimum analyst coverage of ten. Consistent with our firm-level results,
σQj has considerable predictive power, with a highly significant β-coefficient (the t-statistic
is 11.42) and an R2 value of 28.47%. The IBES-based dispersion variable is insignificant
and generates an R2 < 1%. The only other variable with predictive ability is the diffusive
volatility prior to the EAD, though the R2 increases by only 1% to 29.68% when including
all three predictors. These results are robust.18
We provide additional results focusing on realized volatility over the month after an EAD.
Our EAD-jump model predicts an increase in the impact of diffusive volatility over longer
periods. Consistent with this, we find both option-implied variables are highly significant,
although diffusive volatility is now more important. Diffusive IV explains almost 66% of
the variation in a univariate regression, whereas the jump component explains 46%. Mul-
tivariate regressions confirm that the EAD-jump volatility provides significant incremental
information about future realized volatility and is an important predictor of longer-term eq-
18First, we use different analyst dispersion estimates. The main results use equity-split adjusted statistics.
Diether et al. (2002) argue this series can be inaccurate, especially when the reported volatility is low.
Although not a major concern here, we also use unadjusted analyst-level data to construct forecast dispersion.
Our methodology of aggregating the individual forecasts into summaries use several screens with respect to
four criteria: (i) the forecasts are for the same firm and period, (ii) forecasts are issued before the IBES
statistical period, (iii) they are not voided by the IBES data sets ‘Excluded’ or ‘Stopped’, and (iv) they are
the most recent estimates issued by a broker once (i) to (iii) are satisfied. We apply the screens in three ways
to aggregate the raw data into an analyst dispersion measure. For the first set of estimates, rules (i) and
(ii) have to be fulfilled; for the second set rules (i), (ii), and (iv) have to be fulfilled; and for the third set of
estimates all four must hold. Second, we alter the minimum number of analyst forecasts (up to a minimum of
three). Third, we perform various sub-sample analyses. All of our conclusions are robust in sub-samples, and
no findings change substantively across definitions. And forth, we estimate the HAR model of Corsi (2009)
to predict one-day ahead daily variances and one-month ahead monthly variances using high-frequency data
from the TAQ database rather than using implied volatility. Using these predicted variances as regressors
instead of the diffusive part of the IVs does not change the significance of our EA jump measure. Overall,
we find that – in line with a large existing literature – that the diffusive part of the option IVs is a better
predictor than time-series based estimators from the HAR model.
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Table 9: Earnings announcement jump risk premia
This table provides summary statistics on P and Q-measure volatility on earnings announcement days.
The second column (Std) provides the standard deviation of standardized equity returns the day after the
earnings release, column P-Vol (CC) provides the one-day close-to-close standard deviation of returns on
earnings announcement days, Q-Vol mean provides the risk-neutral counterpart. P-Vol (CO) and Q-Vol
jump are based on close-to-open returns and the risk-neutral jump volatility σQj , respectively. The last
column provides estimates of the median of option-implied earnings announcement day volatility under Q.
Year Std
P-Vol
(CC)
Q-Vol
mean
P-Vol
(CO)
Q-Vol
jump
Q-Vol
median
2000 to 2005 0.94 7.63 9.92 6.65 7.46 7.08
2006 to 2010 0.92 7.22 7.74 5.60 6.77 6.15
2011 to 2015 0.91 7.35 6.78 6.60 6.34 5.19
Pooled 0.92 7.42 8.22 6.31 6.87 6.03
uity market volatility. Our findings are consistent with Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003)
who argue that analyst dispersion has predictive power for monthly equity market volatility.
Despite a highly significant slope coefficient, the explained variation of the analyst dispersion
is low (R2 < 3%) and the coefficients are insignificant in multivariate regression.
4.5 Earnings Announcement Jump Risk Premiums
This section analyzes the EAD jump risk premium by comparing P and Q-measure volatili-
ties. Our model assumes continuously-compounded jumps under the Q-measure are normally
distributed with a volatility of σQj , but places few restrictions on the behavior under P. If
there is a risk premium attached to the volatility of jump sizes, then σQj > σ
P
j .
19
We analyze this issue in three ways. First, we compare the realized volatility of returns
under P with the average expected daily volatility of returns under Q. To do this, we
compute the expected one-day volatility under Q from option prices by adding to the EAD
jump volatility one-day’s diffusive volatility (denoted in Table 9 as Q-Vol) and compare
19There is evidence for a diffusive volatility risk premium as well as some evidence for a risk premium
attached to the volatility of jump sizes using index options, see Broadie et al. (2007).
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this to the realized return volatility under P (denoted in Table 9 as P-Vol). Test for equality
across measures is difficult as both are estimated and time-varying. We first note that overall
Q-volatility is 80bps higher than P-volatility on average, and the average Q-volatility is larger
than the average P-volatility for most firms (untabulated), consistent with an earnings jump
premium. These results could be sensitive to outliers, as mean estimates of σQj are higher than
the median. Winsorized statistics (also untabulated) also indicate that Q-Vol is higher than
P-Vol. A comparison of close-to-open return volatility under P with EAD jump volatility σQj
also supports an economically sizable EAD volatility risk premium.20
A second, likely more powerful, statistic is the standard deviation of standardized EAD
returns, stdrj = rj/
√(
σQj
)2
+ σ2∆, where ∆ is one trading day. This accounts for time-
varying volatility and is less sensitive to outliers. The standard deviation of stdrj equals one
if there is no EAD jump risk premium. The column labeled Std in Table 9 provides additional
evidence for an earnings jump volatility risk premium, as the pooled standard deviation is
0.92. The results are stable over the three subsamples with values ranging from 0.91 to 0.94.
A chi-square test confirms that the standard deviations over the full sample period as well
as over all sub-samples are significantly different from one at the 1% level. Overall, all tests
point towards a positive and significant earnings jump volatility risk premium.
The third test computes straddle returns. If σQj > σ
P
j , then writing straddles across
EADs should be profitable. We calculate straddle returns from purchasing an ATM call
and put at the close price prior to the earnings announcement and selling the position at
the close after the announcement. To provide some intuition and to quantify the economic
impact, consider an ATM call and straddle with one-week to maturity, an interest rate of 5%
and St = 25. Prior to the announcement, call and put values were about $1.53 and $3.03,
respectively. Assuming the equity price did not change the following day, the prices after
20We have also verified that splitting the close-to-close return into an overnight and intra-daily component
and estimating the intradaily variance using a high-low variance estimator leads to identical conclusions.
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Table 10: Straddle returns
This table provides summary statistics on the returns of at-the-money straddles that are held the day before
an earnings announcement to the next trading day. We use options of the shortest available maturity (with
at least three days to maturity on the first trading day after the earnings release). We report the mean
(Mean), median (Median), standard deviation (Std), skewness (Skewness), kurtosis (Kurtosis) and the
t-statistic (t-stat). The table also provides bootstrapped distributions for all statistics. For each bootstrap
run, we select for each firm and announcement date in our sample a random date between 35 and 5 days
prior to the announcement or 5 to 35 days after the announcement and calculate ATM straddle returns.
The bootstrapped distributions are calculated from 250 samples.
Statistic Data Bootstrapped Distribution
mean std 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
Mean -7.96 -1.51 0.29 -2.17 -1.94 -1.73 -1.52 -1.31 -1.01 -0.82
Median -10.24 -3.17 0.21 -3.66 -3.50 -3.32 -3.17 -3.01 -2.86 -2.69
Std 27.47 15.01 0.70 13.68 13.97 14.54 14.95 15.28 16.39 17.32
Skewness 1.44 2.27 0.91 1.17 1.40 1.77 2.03 2.44 4.09 5.81
Kurtosis 8.93 21.77 19.64 8.65 9.84 12.92 15.75 20.90 61.27 113.18
t-stat -13.25 -5.40 1.17 -7.92 -7.12 -6.19 -5.44 -4.60 -3.50 -2.63
the announcement fall to $0.68 and $1.65, respectively, an almost 50% decrease solely due to
the drop in volatility from the EAD. If, however, the equity price fell 20% (a two standard
deviation move), then the options are worth $0.0 and $5.03, respectively.
Table 10 reports an average one-day straddle return of -7.96% (across firm-quarter obser-
vations and not annualized), and a median return of -10.24%. Unreported robustness checks
confirm these findings are consistent across time: straddle returns were negative during all 16
years in our sample and have (with one exception) highly significant t-statistics (-13.25 over
the full sample period). The evidence for individual firms (also unreported) confirms that
EAD straddle returns are on average significantly negative. There are only rare exceptions
to this and the highest average firm-level return observed is merely 1%. Given the large
realized volatilities of option strategy returns and the small sample size for individual firms,
firm-level results can be quite sensitive to outliers and high idiosyncratic volatility.
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To frame these results relative to our model, we also conduct a small scale Monte-Carlo
experiment and simulate straddle returns using our reduced-form model of Section 2 for
different values of σPj .
21 The results show that, for realistic parameter values, a wedge of
1% between real-world and risk-neutral EAD jump volatilities implies an average straddle
return of -8.5% for options maturing one week after the EAD. Thus, our empirical straddle
results are completely consistent with a reasonably parametrized jump-diffusion model and
the results from our baseline model. We interpret this as strong evidence supporting σQj > σ
P
j .
To further investigate significance, we perform a bootstrap experiment to understand
the significance of straddle returns around EADs vis-a-vis normal trading days. Although
unlikely given the mixed evidence regarding variance risk premiums in Carr and Wu (2009)
and the large negative straddle returns, our results may be affected by the presence of a
diffusive variance risk premium realized on non-EAD days. To this end, we simulate random
samples as follows. For each firm and EAD, we randomly select a trading day within a
symmetric 70 day window around the EAD (but excluding dates within 5 days of the EAD),
which matches each EAD with a random day with similar overall market conditions. For a
large number of random draws of these days for all firms/EADs, we calculate straddle returns
and record return statistics. There are two noteworthy results (also reported in Table 10).
First, straddle returns are substantially and statistically more negative on EADs than during
normal market periods. The average straddle return of -7.96% compares to a 1%-percentile
of only -2.17% on non-EAD trading days. And second, average straddle returns on non-
EADs are negative providing new evidence for a negative variance risk premium and/or a
risk premium attached to jump times and/or sizes.
Whether it is possible to devise profitable trading strategies to collect the earnings an-
21We use the same parameters as in Section 2.2 and assume that κv = 3 which implies an additional
diffusive volatility risk premium. We randomize the variance before the announcement day by sampling its
stationary distribution. We impose no risk premiums on Poisson jump risk. Our results are not sensitive to
these choices.
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nouncement volatility risk premiums depends crucially on trading costs. Table 1 suggests
that naive trading strategies based on closing bid and ask quotes may consume a substantial
portion of these short straddle returns. Muravyev and Pearson (2016) show that trading
costs in option markets are, however, much lower than quoted bid-ask spreads. An empirical
investigation of the impact of trade timing on the profitability of straddle returns around
EADs is an interesting avenue for future research.
There are also theoretical arguments supporting non-zero EAD jump risk premiums.
Jumps are difficult to hedge which could lead to a premium when combined with the demand-
based arguments in Bollen and Whaley (2004). Garleanu et al. (2009) find that a combination
of demand pressures and unhedgeable risks can create excess option IV. These results are also
related to Ni et al. (2008), who analyze the volatility demand and predictable movements
in realized and IV. As noted earlier, firms with higher EAD volatility have higher market
exposure, which would also suggest a jump volatility risk premium (see also the learning
based explanation in Savor and Wilson (2016) for an EAD mean risk premium).
4.6 Implications for Cross-sectional Studies
Equity IVs have recently been used in a number of empirical asset pricing studies, as regres-
sors or for portfolio sorts. Since equity options that span EAs have significant IV variation
unrelated to fundamentals, some of these sorts may be noisy. In this section, we replicate
the results of Baltussen et al. (2016) (BBG hereafter) and test whether some of their conclu-
sions may be strengthened by explicitly accounting for EAs. Finally, we provide guidance
for empirical research using equity IV data.
BBG use short-term equity options to calculate the standard deviation of IVs over a
calendar month. They show that high volatility of volatility (vol-of-vol) stocks underperform
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low vol-of-vol stocks by about 10 percent per year. Denoting the ATM IV at time t for stock
i as σATMi,t (Te) (where Te > t is the fixed expiration date of the option), the authors define
the vol-of-vol for stock i at time t as
V oVi,t =
√√√√ 1
20
t∑
j=t−19
(
σATMi,j (Te)− σ¯ATMi,t (Te)
)2 × (σ¯ATMi,t (Te))−1 (6)
where
σ¯ATMi,t (Te) =
1
20
t∑
j=t−19
σATMi,j (Te). (7)
For short-dated options, this vol-of-vol measure will be quite noisy and potentially biased
during EA months. As the time to maturity decreases over time (i.e. Te − t decreases),
option IVs exhibit a deterministic upward trend prior to EADs. Then, after the EAD,
IVs drop immediately which will mechanically increases the vol-of-vol for announcing firms.
The effects can be particularly large for firms with high earnings uncertainty and for short
dated options. This suggests that if vol-of-vol is indeed a predictor of future stock returns,
accounting for earnings announcement effects should remove noise in the portfolio sorts and
strengthen BBG’s main findings.
We replicate BBG’s main analysis and form portfolios based on the V oV level. We obtain
share prices from CRSP and (for comparison) restrict our sample from 1/1996 to 12/2009.
We only retain stocks with share code 10 or 11 traded on either NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX.
We remove closed-end funds, REITs and stocks whose prices is $5 or less. Furthermore,
we discard small firms with market capitalization of $225 million or less (in 2009 value).
At the penultimate trading day in each month, we sort all remaining stocks into quintile
portfolios based of V oV . Following BBG we use options that expire during the next trading
month, which means that at the time of the sort, the options used in the calculation of
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Table 11: Quintile Portfolios of Stocks Sorted by Vol-of-Vol.
The first portfolio (Low VoV) contains stocks with the lowest monthly Vol-of-Vol in the previous month
and portfolio 5 (High VoV) contains stocks with the highest monthly Vol-of-Vol in the previous month.
We equally-weight stocks in each quintile portfolio and rebalance monthly. For each portfolio columns (2)
to (5) report the average raw returns, the CAPM and four-factor Fama-French-Carhart (FFC-4F) alphas.
Panel A includes all stocks, Panel B uses only stocks with an earnings announcement during the portfolio
formation month, whereas Panel C imposes the restriction that no earnings announcements occur during
the portfolio formation month.
Panel A: Univariate Sort by VoV Return
Excess
Return
CAPM
Alpha
FFC-4F
Alpha
Low VoV 0.83 0.55 0.22 0.04
Q2 1.03 0.75 0.40 0.34
Q3 0.81 0.53 0.16 0.11
Q4 0.63 0.34 -0.05 -0.02
High VoV 0.21 -0.08 -0.51 -0.41
High minus Low Difference -0.63 -0.73 -0.46
t-statistic (-2.14) (-2.76) (-2.17)
Panel B: Univariate Sort by VoV (EA in formation
month)
Return
Excess
Return
CAPM
Alpha
FFC-4F
Alpha
Low VoV (EA in formation month) 0.31 0.02 -0.31 -0.55
Q2 0.87 0.59 0.25 0.20
Q3 0.99 0.71 0.35 0.37
Q4 0.53 0.25 -0.14 -0.08
High VoV (EA in formation month) 0.41 0.13 -0.26 -0.09
High minus Low Difference 0.11 0.04 0.45
t-statistic (0.27) (0.10) (1.40)
Panel C: Univariate Sort by VoV (no EA in for-
mation month)
Return
Excess
Return
CAPM
Alpha
FFC-4F
Alpha
Low VoV (no EA in formation month) 1.04 0.76 0.43 0.28
Q2 1.03 0.74 0.38 0.29
Q3 0.96 0.68 0.30 0.24
Q4 0.76 0.47 0.08 0.07
High VoV (no EA in formation month) -0.05 -0.33 -0.77 -0.71
High minus Low Difference -1.09 -1.20 -0.99
t-statistic (-3.61) (-4.56) (-4.04)
40
V oV have relatively short maturities (on average approximately one month). We then hold
equally-weighted quintile portfolios during the next calendar month and rebalance monthly.
Panel A of Table 11 reports the results and confirms that the high-minus-low portfolio
earns a negative CAPM alpha of -0.73% a month (BBG find a CAPM alpha of -0.50% with
a t-statistic of -2.99). Note that our overall results differ marginally from BBG as our high-
minus-low portfolio has a slightly larger return spread and quintile alphas are not completely
monotone. Overall, our findings are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to BGG.
In Panel B, we restrict the portfolio sorts to firms which report earnings during the
formation month. Since the exact timing of the EAD is not critical for this exercise, we rely
on Compustat data for these announcements. As expected, results for this subset are quite
different from the overall results in Panel A. We find no significant relationship between
V oV and subsequent stock returns. In fact, excess returns and alphas now have opposite
(positive) signs and are insignificant. In Panel C, results for the subset of stocks that do not
announce earnings strengthen the overall conclusions in BBG as V oV is a stronger predictor
when V oV is less noisy as return spreads and significance levels both increase. We repeat
the analysis with value-weighted portfolio sorts and a range of different data filters and in
all cases arrive at the same conclusions. We provide further evidence below which confirm
that the insignificant return spreads in Panel B are due to the impact of EADs on IVs.
The empirical asset pricing literature considers a wide range of measures constructed
from option prices and hence the impact of earnings announcements on empirical results
may vary widely. And while it is difficult to provide general advice on how to deal with
earnings announcements in empirical work, we can provide a list of important issues that
should be considered when determining the impact of earnings releases on measures of equity
IVs.
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First, interpolated constant-maturity IVs have the advantage of removing the determin-
istic upward drift which is particularly pronounced in short-term options. Using interpolated
data, measures based on IV changes may be constructed by removing only a handful of trad-
ing days: the EAD and potentially days on which the announcement enters the calculation
for the first time. Despite the widespread use of interpolated IVs from OptionMetrics, it is
also worth noting, however, that OptionMetrics interpolated volatilities and use a log trans-
formation of the time to maturity in their interpolation method. Our model-based results
imply that the most reasonable interpolation is linear in variances (as for instance in Carr
and Wu (2009)).
Second, depending on the application, it may be useful to separate diffusive and EAD
jump volatility (as we do in Section 3). While this approach has theoretical advantages,
it requires the earnings dates and times and may suffer from noise due to database errors
and missing EAD information. Third, an important consideration is the choice of option
maturity. While many studies rely on short term IVs due to higher liquidity and trading
volume, longer term IVs are far less affected by EAs than short-term options. For instance,
when we repeat the analysis of BBG with longer-term options, we find that the difference
between announcing firms and non-announcing firms narrows substantially and that the vol-
of-vol effect exhibits the same sign in both groups with only minor differences in the alphas
for the spread portfolios. For instance, using options with one year to maturity, the CAPM
alpha of the high-minus-low portfolio for announcing firms is -0.81% compared to -0.79% for
non-announcing firms (untabulated). This result is theoretically expected and supports our
claim that earnings releases are the main driver of the empirical results in Panel B of Table
11. Depending on the research question, longer dated IVs may be sufficient. Finally, it is
essential to provide robustness checks by removing EADs and/or announcing firms unless
the research question explicitly deals with earnings announcements. Han and Zhou (2012)
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and Vasquez (2015) for example split the sample into announcing and non-announcing firms
(as we do in this section). Earnings announcements are not only important because of the
variation they cause in IVs, but they also affect returns through different channels (Beaver
(1968), Cohen et al. (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2007) and Savor and Wilson (2016)).
4.7 Option Pricing Implications
This section analyzes earnings jumps in standard SV models with randomly timed jumps in
prices. This allows us to quantify the economic impact on option prices and compare the
impact of EAs to other components such as randomly timed jumps.
The literature on individual equity options is relatively small compared to the literature
on index options. One reason for this is the computational difficulty present in calibrating
SV models on many firms. Bakshi et al. (2012) study the performance of option pricing
specifications nested in the double jump model of Duffie et al. (2000) and conclude that
“in contrast to index-options, [jump] model generalizations are unable to produce a large
improvement for near-the-money individual equity options.” They find that there is greater
improvement for deep OTM options. Further studies on individual equity options include
Christoffersen et al. (2015), who model the joint dynamics of index and individual equity
options, and Carr and Wu (2016), who propose a self-exciting jump model and estimate it
on equity options of five individual firms. This paper is the first to explicitly account for
earnings announcements in the data-generating process and to quantify the impact.
We consider a number of nested versions of the earnings jump model developed in Section
2: SVJEJ is the full specification with SV, randomly timed jumps and earnings jumps; SVJ
is the model without EAD jumps; SVEJ is the model with earnings jumps; and SV is a
purely diffusive SV model. For all four models, we estimate the parameters and filter the
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latent variance process using the unscented Kalman filter of Julier and Uhlmann (1997) and
Wan and Van Der Merwe (2000).22 To describe our approach, let IV
(
St, Vt,Υ
Q, Tn, Kn
)
denote the model-based IV of an option with strike Kn and time to maturity Tn, and let
ΥQ =
(
κQ, θQ, σv, ρ, σ̂
Q, λ¯Q, µ¯Qy , σ¯
Q
y
)
denote the structural parameters. For simplicity we
assume that the EAD jump volatility σQj is constant over time, i.e. σ
Q
j = σ̂
Q for all j, and
hence our deterministic jump models require only one additional parameter. Extensions to
time-changing jump volatilities are left to future research.
The observation equation is given by
IV mt (Tn, Kn) = IV
(
St, Vt,Υ
Q, Tn, Kn
)
+ et,n ∀n = 1, . . . , nt, t = 1, . . . , T (8)
where IV mt is the observed IV at time t and nt is the number of options available at time t.
23
The error term et,n is assumed to be i.i.d. normal with mean zero and standard deviation σe.
The state evolution is given by a time discretization of the P-dynamics of the square-root
variance process. This approach provides estimates of the spot variances, the SV and jump
parameters under the Q-measure, and the P-measure parameters of the SV process.
We construct a sample of option prices by averaging the IV for the put/call option pair
closest to the money for each maturity and day and also for the option pairs with moneyness
closest to 0.90 and 1.10. To our knowledge and due to computational burdens, few calibration
procedures use daily data over long time samples, most studies focus on weekly data (see
22This procedure imposes that the model parameters remain constant during the whole sample period.
Ideally, one would estimate the model using, in addition to option prices, the time series of returns. Other
approaches include EMM (Chernov and Ghysels (2000)), implied-state GMM (Pan (2002)), MCMC (Eraker
(2004)), or the approximate MLE approach of Aı¨t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007). These approaches are in prin-
ciple statistically efficient, however the computational demands of pricing options for each simulated latent
volatility path and parameter vector constrains research short data samples and/or few options contracts
(typically one per day).
23See Christoffersen and Jacobs (2004) for a discussion of choice of loss function.
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for instance Bates (2000), Christoffersen et al. (2010) or Andersen et al. (2015)).24 For our
sample, the computational burden of using daily data, multiple options and several firms is
extreme: we have to numerically compute around 150,000 option prices for each objective
function evaluation. Due to these computational burdens, we restrict our empirical analysis
to all firms that remain in our sample throughout entire period: AMZN, GE, IBM, INTC,
MSFT, and QCOM.25 These firms vary substantially in terms of the earnings jump volatilities
reported in Section 4.3.
To understand the impact of earnings jumps, consider first option pricing errors as a
measure of overall fit. Figure 2 provides the difference between the average absolute IV
pricing errors for SV and SVEJ for the days surrounding EADs, in addition to pricing errors
by option maturity. To economize on space, we focus on SV and SVEJ and provide detailed
results for other models upon request. Accounting for jumps on EADs leads to a significant
pricing improvement: in the week before an EAD, overall pricing errors across all firms can
fall by more than 50%, the errors fall in all cases. To provide further intuition, for Intel the
mean absolute pricing errors fall in the three days prior to earnings announcements from
4.111, 3.911 and 4.554 in the SV model to 1.925, 1.623 and 2.047 in the SVEJ model, respec-
tively (untabulated). The earnings announcement effect is most pronounced in short-dated
options, given their sensitivity to earnings jumps, but there is also a significant improvement
in long-dated option prices. In SV models, IVs are only driven by spot volatility, Vt, and,
intuitively, if spot volatility increases enough to match short-dated IVs, it will massively
overshoot longer-dated IVs, a tension released by accounting for earnings jumps. Although
24Pan (2002) uses two option prices sampled weekly over a five year period, Eraker (2004) uses a single
option price for every day over a four year period.
25Additionally we estimate all structural models for all firms that are missing only during one year:
Cisco Systems (CSCO), Goldman Sachs (GS), JP Morgan/Chase Manhattan Bank (JPM), Wal-Mart Stores
(WMT) and Apple (AAPL), which is missing during two years. Due to space restrictions, we do note report
these additional results which are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the results presented in
this section.
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Figure 2: Pricing Errors Around Earnings Announcement Days
This figure reports the relative difference between the mean absolute pricing errors of the SV and SVEJ
model on trading days around earnings announcements: MAPE(SV )/MAPE(SV EJ)−1, where MAPE(M)
denotes the mean absolute pricing error of model M . The data set is a representative daily option sample
from January 2000 to August 2015. Pricing errors are grouped into four different categories: all (all options),
short (less than 30 days to maturity), medium (between 31 and 90 days to maturity) and long (more than
90 days to maturity). We report estimation results for Amazon (ticker: AMZN), General Electric (GE),
Intel Corporation (INTC), International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Microsoft (MSFT) and
Qualcomm (QCOM). For exact model definitions see Section 2 and 4.7.
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not reported, models incorporating randomly timed jumps do not add any further pricing
improvements around EADs (we provide further details below).
Table 12 provides pricing errors by moneyness and maturity. In addition to the four
SV-based models, for comparison we also provide pricing errors for the Black-Scholes model
augmented with earnings jumps (BSEJ). We estimate pricing errors for this model by simply
minimizing the squared pricing errors between model and IV.26 We classify options according
to their moneyness (OTM, ITM or ATM) and use three different maturity categories. There
is a substantial pricing improvement for all firms and categories. For intel, the improvement is
36%, 14%, and 24%, respectively, for the three maturity categories. SVEJ also offers sizeable
improvements for ATM options with errors decreasing from 1.81 to 1.40. Our results contrast
with Bakshi et al. (2012) who find that randomly timed jumps in prices or in volatility provide
little benefit for pricing ATM options. Overall, our results indicate that incorporating jumps
on EADs provides first order pricing improvements not only around EADs, but over the entire
sample.
Table 13 summarizes fits and parameter estimates for each of the four models. Overall, we
find strong evidence for earnings jumps, as well as evidence for leverage effects and randomly
timed jumps in returns. In terms of model fits, the final column shows the incremental
improvements for each of the components and our results indicate that earnings jumps are
far more important than randomly timed price jumps. For example, for Intel, σe is 3.34%,
2.54%, 3.28%, and 2.52% for SV, SVEJ, SVJ, and SVJEJ models, respectively, indicative of a
modest improvement of randomly timed jumps and a larger improvement of earnings jumps.
This result is consistent across firms, and even firms with low anticipated uncertainty on
26In order to estimate errors, we first fix an earnings jump parameter and optimize on each trading day
the diffusive volatility which implies a daily recalibration of the diffusive volatility. We then alternate the
earnings jump parameter until an optimum is found. Note that the BSEJ model is less constrained in
its minimization of pricing errors as we do not filter the variance path for this model. In addition BSEJ
is calibrated using an option pricing error metric whereas the unscented Kalman filter used for the other
models includes both a likelihood term for the variance path and observed option prices.
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Table 12: Option pricing error by moneyness and maturity
This table reports the mean absolute pricing errors for the BSEJ, SV, SVEJ, SVJ and SVJEJ
models. The data set is a representative daily option sample from January 2000 to August 2015.
Pricing errors are grouped into six different categories: OTM (if M < 0.95), ATM (if 0.95 ≤M ≤
1.05), ITM (if M > 1.05), short (less than 30 days to maturity), medium (between 31 and 90 days
to maturity) and long (more than 90 days to maturity). We report estimation results for Amazon
(ticker: AMZN), General Electric (GE), Intel Corporation (INTC), International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM), Microsoft (MSFT) and Qualcomm (QCOM). For exact model definitions see
Section 2 and 4.7.
Firm Model Option Categories
All OTM ATM ITM short medium long
AMZN BSEJ 2.40 2.84 1.88 2.51 3.40 2.00 2.03
SV 2.66 2.73 2.63 2.61 3.92 2.35 2.15
SVEJ 1.99 2.10 1.87 2.01 2.95 1.55 1.70
SVJ 2.59 2.61 2.61 2.56 3.75 2.29 2.16
SVJEJ 1.94 1.98 1.90 1.93 2.83 1.48 1.71
GE BSEJ 2.22 2.85 1.51 2.46 3.61 2.31 1.77
SV 1.60 1.80 1.40 1.65 2.87 1.49 1.28
SVEJ 1.51 1.68 1.33 1.56 2.70 1.38 1.23
SVJ 1.55 1.61 1.46 1.62 2.77 1.41 1.26
SVJEJ 1.51 1.61 1.36 1.58 2.61 1.38 1.24
IBM BSEJ 2.21 2.77 1.52 2.46 3.42 1.95 1.71
SV 1.93 2.16 1.74 1.91 2.84 1.39 1.69
SVEJ 1.61 1.75 1.45 1.67 2.44 1.20 1.41
SVJ 1.79 1.91 1.72 1.73 2.71 1.24 1.58
SVJEJ 1.51 1.61 1.43 1.52 2.30 1.14 1.32
INTC BSEJ 2.10 2.55 1.58 2.23 3.51 1.87 1.68
SV 1.88 1.97 1.81 1.85 3.28 1.47 1.49
SVEJ 1.49 1.55 1.40 1.55 2.70 1.18 1.21
SVJ 1.82 1.84 1.82 1.81 3.17 1.40 1.46
SVJEJ 1.48 1.49 1.44 1.52 2.64 1.15 1.21
MSFT BSEJ 1.94 2.40 1.40 2.11 3.10 1.80 1.60
SV 1.61 1.73 1.47 1.64 2.76 1.30 1.35
SVEJ 1.46 1.59 1.29 1.52 2.52 1.18 1.23
SVJ 1.54 1.60 1.46 1.57 2.56 1.22 1.33
SVJEJ 1.42 1.50 1.31 1.47 2.38 1.12 1.24
QCOM BSEJ 2.31 2.79 1.68 2.53 3.54 1.98 1.87
SV 1.92 2.06 1.76 1.98 3.12 1.45 1.62
SVEJ 1.68 1.82 1.46 1.78 2.73 1.22 1.43
SVJ 1.87 1.97 1.74 1.94 2.99 1.43 1.58
Continued on next page
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Table 12 – continued from previous page
Firm Model Option Categories
All OTM ATM ITM short medium long
SVJEJ 1.66 1.76 1.49 1.74 2.61 1.22 1.44
Table 13: Parameter estimates.
This table reports the estimation results for the SV, SVEJ, SVJ and SVJEJ models. The parameters
are estimated using the unscented Kalman filter on a representative daily option sample from
January 2000 to August 2015. For each parameter, we report estimates and asymptotic standard
errors in parenthesis. We report estimation results for Amazon (ticker: AMZN), General Electric
(GE), Intel Corporation (INTC), International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), Microsoft
(MSFT) and Qualcomm (QCOM). For exact model definitions see Section 2 and 4.7.
Firm κv θv σv ρ κ
Q
v θ
Q
v λ¯
Q
y µ¯
Q
y (%) σ¯
Q
y (%) σ̂
Q(%) σe(%)
AMZN 1.28 0.36 0.80 -0.55 0.88 0.28 3.91
(0.25) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
1.28 0.36 0.77 -0.63 0.73 0.21 8.77 3.24
(0.23) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
0.89 0.12 0.94 -0.85 0.52 0.31 38.28 -0.49 3.85 3.81
(0.13) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
1.15 0.36 0.76 -0.89 0.60 0.18 6.70 -0.17 7.33 8.70 3.13
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00)
GE 3.22 0.10 0.98 -0.43 0.85 0.14 2.57
(0.51) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3.46 0.10 1.11 -0.45 0.53 0.21 2.95 2.44
(0.73) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
0.69 0.05 0.86 -0.65 0.72 0.10 4.59 0.10 5.60 2.50
(0.34) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.63 0.06 0.78 -0.66 0.85 0.09 0.69 0.34 13.02 2.86 2.41
(0.33) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
IBM 4.07 0.09 1.00 -0.44 1.70 0.09 3.21
(0.83) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
0.75 0.12 1.07 -0.47 1.16 0.10 4.15 2.59
(0.65) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.75 0.04 0.81 -0.69 1.29 0.05 6.59 -1.17 5.62 3.01
(0.46) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.75 0.09 0.62 -0.78 1.16 0.05 2.30 -1.52 7.40 4.03 2.46
(0.12) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
INTC 2.68 0.17 0.96 -0.38 1.46 0.13 3.34
(0.55) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
1.78 0.16 0.88 -0.47 1.05 0.13 5.07 2.54
(0.63) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – continued from previous page
Model κv θv σv ρ κ
Q
v θ
Q
v λ¯
Q
y µ¯
Q
y (%) σ¯
Q
y (%) σ̂
Q(%) σe(%)
0.63 0.11 0.90 -0.65 1.16 0.09 9.67 -0.10 5.45 3.28
(0.40) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
0.63 0.14 0.76 -0.71 0.97 0.10 4.16 0.10 6.26 5.01 2.52
(0.27) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)
MSFT 2.20 0.11 0.76 -0.39 1.04 0.11 2.64
(0.69) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
2.23 0.11 0.82 -0.41 0.74 0.13 3.93 2.39
(0.33) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.63 0.06 0.65 -0.72 0.85 0.08 6.43 0.05 5.72 2.54
(0.22) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
0.75 0.07 0.61 -0.74 0.79 0.08 3.01 0.24 7.11 3.79 2.32
(0.34) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
QCOM 0.68 0.36 0.86 -0.47 0.71 0.23 3.01
(0.16) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.53 0.34 0.89 -0.52 0.56 0.25 5.02 2.72
(0.10) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
0.05 0.16 0.79 -0.67 0.53 0.21 5.16 -0.69 6.78 2.92
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
0.52 0.22 0.74 -0.70 0.56 0.18 2.22 -1.12 8.89 4.92 2.65
(0.09) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00)
EADs (General Electric for example) provide evidence if favor of SVEJ over a random jump
model. Although not reported, a likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the restrictions
that jump volatilities are zero.27
In terms of earnings jump estimates, we focus on σ̂Q and use Intel as an example. The
average jump volatility for Intel from the term structure and time series estimator was 7.04
and 6.17, respectively. The estimates using the formal SV model extensions are similar,
although values are lower with slightly more than 5%. Similar results are obtained for the
other firms. There are at least two reasons why these estimates may differ. First, the
time-series and term-structure estimators of the previous section use one and two options,
27Our primary goal is to quantify the pricing improvements generated by jumps on EADs. Although
common in the literature, we do not perform an out-of-sample pricing exercise. As noted in Bates (2003),
these tests, in general, are not particularly useful for analyzing model specification: “Perhaps the one test
that does not appear to be especially informative is short-horizon “out-of-sample” option pricing tests...” (p.
396).
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respectively, whereas the full estimation results use information contained in all options that
are affected by earnings announcement jumps. This means that on each day at least three
options are affected and an earnings announcement will have a significant impact on options
for at least a month prior to the announcement. If investor’s perceptions of σ̂Q changes
in the days and weeks prior to the earnings announcement, this would result in slightly
lower estimates. And second, the SV model imposes that the parameters in the model are
constant through time, whereas the term-structure and time-series estimators allow volatility
to differ at each announcement. Due to this, the estimates based on the extension of the
Black-Scholes model are less constrained and less subject to potential misspecification. For
robustness, we have experimented with additional calibration methodologies and find that
our EA jump volatility estimators are indeed very close if the same option data is used in the
estimation. Provided our estimation routine provides a lower bound, the impact of EAs on
option pricing applications that we report is conservative. Further discussion of structural
model parameters is relegated to Appendix A.7.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops models incorporating earnings announcements for pricing options and
for learning about the uncertainty embedded in an individual firm’s earnings announce-
ment. We take into account the timing of earnings announcements and develop a model
and pricing approach incorporating jumps on EADs. We introduce estimators of the un-
certainty surrounding earnings announcements and discuss the general properties of models
with deterministically-timed jumps. Empirically, we find strong evidence that earnings an-
nouncements are important components of option prices, we investigate risk premiums, and
we analyze the underlying assumptions of the model. To quantify the impact on option
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prices, we calibrate a SV model and find that accounting for jumps on EADs is extremely
important for pricing options. Models without jumps on EADs have large and systematic
pricing errors around earnings dates. A SV model incorporating earnings jumps drastically
lowers the pricing errors and reduces misspecification in the volatility process.
There are a number of interesting extensions. First, we are interested in understanding
the ex ante information in macroeconomic announcements. Ederington and Lee (1996) and
Beber and Brandt (2006) document a strong decrease in IV subsequent to major macroeco-
nomic announcements, which is the same effect we document for earnings announcements.28
Second, it would be interesting to explore how investors form expectations about anticipated
earnings uncertainty and timing of information gathering.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Transform Analysis
This section provides details on the option transforms. To price options, we need to evaluate
the conditional transform of log (ST ). In our framework, the logarithm of the stock price
consists of two independent, additive components. First, an affine process for which the
characteristic function is well-defined and provided in Duffie et al. (2000). The second
component is a simple discrete process with deterministic jumps at known times. Since the
two components are independent, the characteristic function of the log stock price is given
by the product of the characteristic functions of the two components. It follows that the
discounted transform for c ∈ C is exponentially affine:
Ψ (c, St, Vt, t, T ) = E
Q
t [exp (−r (T − t)) exp (c · log (ST ))]
= exp (α (c, t, T ) + β (c, t, T )Vt + c · log (St))
where β (c, t, T ) and α (c, t, T ) are given by
β (c, t, T ) =
c (1− c) [1− eγv(T−t)]
2γv −
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αv − κQv
)
[1− eγv(T−t)]
α (c, t, T ) = α∗ (c, t, T ) + α (c, t, T ) +
NdT∑
j=Ndt +1
(
− c
2
(
σQj
)2
+
c2
2
(
σQj
)2)
with
α∗ (c, t, T ) = rτ (c− 1) + −κ
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1
τ = T − t, γv =
[(
σvρc− κQv
)
+ c (1− c)σ2v
]1/2
and αv = γv + σvρc.
The transform with deterministic jumps has a particularly simple structure under our
assumptions. To see this, note that
log (ST ) = log (St) +
∫ T
t
(
r − 1
2
Vs − λ¯QyEQt
[
eZ¯j(Q) − 1
])
ds+
∫ T
t
√
VtdW
s
t (Q)
+
N¯T (Q)∑
j=N¯t(Q)+1
Z¯j(Q) +
NdT∑
j=Ndt +1
Zj(Q)
= log
(
S˜T
)
+
NdT∑
j=Ndt +1
Zj(Q)
where log
(
S˜T
)
is the standard affine component. Assuming deterministic jumps are condi-
tionally independent of the affine state variables, the transform of log (ST ) is just the product
of the traditional affine transform and the transform of the deterministic jumps:
EQt [exp (−r (T − t)) exp (c · log (ST ))]
= EQt
[
exp (−r (T − t)) exp
(
c · log
(
S˜T
))]
EQt
exp
c NdT∑
j=Ndt +1
Zj(Q)

= exp [α (t) + β (t) · Vt + c · log (St)] exp
(
αd (t)
)
where EQt
[
exp
(
c
∑NdT
j=Ndt +1
Zj(Q)
)]
= exp
(
αd (t)
)
for some state-independent function αd,
α∗ (t) = α∗ (c, t, T ), and β (t) = β (c, t, T ). This implies that only the constant term in the
exponential is adjusted. Thus, option pricing with earnings announcements requires only
minor modifications of existing approaches.
Our model structure is particularly simple as deterministic jumps do not affect the per-
sistent stochastic volatility process which is completely independent of the jump. In a recent
2
paper, Kim and Wright (2014) propose multi-factor term-structure models with determin-
istic jumps in the state variables on economic announcement days. In their model, the
deterministic jump leads to time-inhomogeneous ODEs as the jump in a mean reverting
process affects the mean-reversion behavior after the announcement and hence one has to
account for this additional feature.
A.2 Black-Scholes and Stochastic Volatility
This appendix analyzes the impact of SV on the earnings announcement jump estimators.
Standard SV models imply that volatility has predictable components and potentially large
and asymmetric shocks. The time series and term structure estimators formally assume a
constant expected diffusive volatility, which could result in a systematic bias.
The first issue can be addressed using the insights of Hull and White (1987) and Bates
(1996). Under mild conditions on SV, if shocks to volatility and returns are independent,
then the SV option price is the expectation of the Black-Scholes price where the Black-Scholes
implied variance is the expected integrated risk-neutral variance EIVt,T = E
Q
t
[∫ t+T
t
Vsds
]
.
Based on this, it is common to assume that Black-Scholes implied variance is an accurate
proxy for expected risk neutral variance, that is,
(
σBSt,T
)2 ≈ EIVt,T . The errors in assuming
that
(
σBSt,T
)2 ≈ EIVt,T are generally small for ATM index options, and will be even smaller
for individual equity options. For ATM options, Hull and White (1987) find the errors are
less than 1% with no leverage and only 1.6% when ρ = −0.6. The errors are even smaller for
shorter maturities which we use in our empirical analysis. Of course, approximation errors
can be quite large for out-of-the-money options.
Price jumps also do not lead to a substantial bias. Merton (1976) finds that the errors
of using the Black-Scholes model with a properly adjusted variance are extremely small for
3
ATM options.29 Chernov (2007) quantifies the approximation in models for index option
pricing with non mean-zero jumps in prices, non-zero correlation, and jumps in volatility
and concludes the bias, for at-the-money options, is negligible. Errors are even smaller
here, as the references cited above indicate that the leverage effect is smaller for individual
equity than for indices. Since all of our estimators rely on differences between Black-Scholes
implied variances, any level biases are differenced out. Thus we conclude that assuming(
σBSt,T
)2
= EIVt,T does not introduce any substantive biases.
Assume that there are two ATM options available at maturities T1 and T2 and there is one
earnings announcement between time t and T2 > T1. For generality, consider a square-root
SV model with Poisson jumps in variance:
dVt = κ
Q
v
(
θQv − Vt
)
dt+ σv
√
VtdW
v
t (Q) + d
(∑N¯t(Q)
j=1 Z¯
v
j (Q)
)
,
where the shocks are all independent, Z¯vj (Q) > 0 with mean µ¯Qv , N¯t(Q) is Poisson process
with intensity λ¯Qv under Q. It is important to note that there is no evidence that the variance
for individual equities jumps, however, we include it here for completeness and to understand
its potential impact.
Both the term structure and time series estimators rely on differences between the implied
variances of two option maturities. To understand how SV affects these estimators, first,
compute the expected integrated variance:
EIVt,Ti = θ˜
Q
v +
1− e−κQvTi
κQv Ti
(
Vt − θ˜Qv
)
, (9)
29Merton was surprised how small the errors were: “What I did find rather surprising is the general level
of the magnitudes of the errors. For the smallest frequency value examined, the percentage of variation
caused by the jump component had to exceed forty percent before an error of more than five percent could
be generated... In summary, the effect of specification error in the underlying equity returns on option prices
will generally be rather small... However, there are some important exceptions...deep out-of-the-money
options can have very large percentage errors.” (p. 345).
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where θ˜Qv = λ¯
Q
v µ¯
Q
v /κ
Q
v + θ
Q
v . The estimators’ accuracy depends on how variable EIVt,T is as
a function of T (for the term structure estimator) and t (for the time series estimator). The
term structure estimator relies on the difference between Black-Scholes implied variances,(
σBSt,T1
)2−(σBSt,T2)2 . Since volatility jumps merely alter the long-run mean in EIVt,Ti , they have
no impact of the term structure estimator above and beyond the mean-reversion term, so
they can be ignored. Time-varying volatility can have an impact because EIVt,T1 6= EIVt,T2 .
This implies that there is a predictable difference in expected volatility over, for example,
two weeks and six weeks. Independent of any model, this difference is likely minor. As
mentioned in the text, since volatility is very persistent, there will be very little difference
in forecasts of volatility over the relatively short horizons used here. Moreover, the IV term
structure is very flat for both indices (Broadie et al. (2007)) and individual firms, which
implies that the variation in expected variance over short horizons tends to be small.
In the SV model above, Vt−θQv , κQv , and Ti could each impact the term structure estimator,
while realized jumps in volatility and Brownian shocks have no impact. For each of these,
the impact will likely be minor. For example, unless there are large volatility risk premiums
(for which there is no evidence for individual firms), θQv ≈ θPv which implies that, on average
Vt ≈ θQ. This further implies biases will be small, at least on average. Since the IV term
structure is very flat, even in periods of very high volatility and especially for the shortest
maturities, this implies that Vt is close to θ
Q
v and/or κ
Q
v is small. Volatility is also highly
persistent and we use short-dated options, implying that κQv and Ti are small and thus the
predictable differences in IV over various maturities is small.
More formally, there is some evidence regarding likely parameter values. For index op-
tions, Pan finds that κQv = −0.05, which implies explosive volatility, but it is not statistically
different from zero.30 Using time series models, Cheung and Johannes (2006) analyze square-
30Typical risk premium estimates imply that κQv < κ
P
v, see, for example, Pan (2002) or Eraker (2004).
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root SV models with jumps on EADs. They find that individual firm volatility, once earnings
announcements are accounted for, is more persistence than index volatility with estimates of
κv being around 1.5-3. Since it is typically assumed that κ
Q
v < κ
P
v , this implies a relatively
modest level of mean-reversion. In section 4.7, we report estimates of κQv of the order of 1.
The term structure of IVs is also very flat. This is true for both indices and individual
equity options. For example, Broadie et al. (2007) find that the slope of the IV term structure
is less than 1% for S&P 500 options. The same result holds for the firms in our dataset.
A flat average term structure indicates that θQv ≈ θPv and/or that κQv is small. Further
evidence pointing toward mild risk-neutral mean-reversion comes from variation in the slope
of the IV term structure for individual options. In addition to little average slope, there
is also very little term structure slope even in very high or very low states. For example,
Table A.1 shows that for MSFT and INTC the (5, 95)% quantile of the term structure
slope is (−2.86, 1.40)% and (−3.44, 1.41)%, respectively, pointing to a very low value of
κQv . Last, most trading volume is concentrated in short-dated options, and we use the
shortest maturities for estimation. In practice, we almost always have the two near maturity
contracts. Putting the pieces together, this implies that any the impact of mean-reversion
is small.
To provide some further intuition regarding the size of the errors, consider the following
reasonable SV parameters: θQv = (0.3)
2, κQv = 2.5, and σ
Q
j = 0.10. Compared to the
empirical evidence, this is a high level of mean reversion. Computing the term structure based
estimator for
√
Vt = (0.20, 0.40.0.50), assuming the short-dated option matures in one week
(1/52), two weeks (2/52), or three weeks (3/52) and assuming the second option matures
one-month later, we have that σj
Q = (0.0995, 0.1007, 0.1017), (0.0988, 0.1017, 0.1038), or
(0.0979, 0.1029, 0.1064), respectively. The effect is small as volatility is persistent and option
Jones (2003), like Pan (2002), finds explosive risk-neutral volatility, although its magnitude is small.
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maturities are short, implying that
(
1− e−κQvTi
)
/κQv Ti does not vary a lot across maturities.
Next, consider the time series estimator:
(
σBSt,Ti
)2 − (σBSt+∆,Ti−∆)2 = EIVt,Ti − EIVt+∆,Ti−∆ + T−1i (σQj )2 ,
and note that EIVt,Ti is a function of Vt while EIVt+∆,Ti−∆ is a function of Vt+∆. If Vt ≈ Vt+∆,
then the estimator is quite accurate as the effect of mean-reversion over one-day is negligible.
Using the parameters from above, the estimates for three weeks (i.e. the estimator with the
largest bias) are σj
Q = (0.10006, 0.09990, 0.09979).
If volatility increases or decreases substantially, the performance of the time series estima-
tor deteriorates quickly, EIVt,Ti and EIVt+∆,Ti−∆ are quite different. Changes in Vt are driven
in the specification above by σv, the Brownian paths, and Z¯
v
j . For the firms in our sample, the
volatility of daily changes in volatility is around three to five percent, which implies that nor-
mal variation could result in large movements in IV. To gauge their impact, suppose that cur-
rent spot volatility is 30% and consider a range of changes in volatility on the following day,
Vt+∆ = (0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.35, 0.40, 0.50). While it is very unlikely that volatility would decrease
this much in one day (as jumps in volatility are typically assumed to be positive), we include
the lower volatilities to understand the potential impact. For options maturing in three weeks
and the same parameters as above, σQj = (0.1197, 0.1127, 0.1072, 0.0908, 0.0789, 0.0369). The
potential impact is much larger and, more importantly, is asymmetric: if volatility increases
from 30% to 50%, the estimate is biased down by 6.31% while if volatility were to decrease
from 30% to 10%, the estimate is biased upward only by 1.97%.
The effect increases with maturity, so that the bias is greater when long-dated options are
used. Intuitively, diffusive volatility is more important for long-dated options, magnifying the
impact of the shocks. This effect may cause some of the errors we observe, especially if only
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options with longer maturities are available. For example, if σQj = 0.05, the shortest-dated
option has 6 weeks to maturity, and Vt increases from 30% to 35%,
(
σBSt,Ti
)2 − (σBSt+∆,Ti−∆)2
is negative. Long-dated options, combined with close-price issues are, in our opinion, the
major cause of the problematic dates for the time series estimator.
Our conclusions are as follows. First, the term structure and time series estimators are
generally reliable estimators of σQj , even in the presence of SV and/or jumps. Second, the
accuaracy of the term structure depends on Vt, θ
Q
v , and κ
Q
v and for reasonable parameters,
any bias generated is quite small. The performance of the time series estimator depends
additionally on σv and the realized shocks driving the volatility process. Because of this, the
time series estimator is noisier and less reliable than the term structure estimator. Third, for
the time series estimator, the magnitudes in the bias are large enough to generate problem
dates. Finally, because increases in Vt result in a larger downward bias in estimates of σ
Q
j
than decreases in Vt (holding the size of increase/decrease constant), the time series estimator
will likely have a downward bias if the variance is time-varying or if there are positive jumps
in the variance, consistent the empirical estimates.
A.3 Close/open and open/close behavior
We assume that earnings announcements generate a discontinuity in the sample path of
equity prices. An alternative assumption is that the diffusion coefficient increases on days
following earnings announcements, as in PW (1979, 1981). Thus, the main difference between
our model and PW’s model is the discontinuity of the sample path. With discretely sampled
prices, it is impossible to identify when jumps occurred with certainty. It is common to use
statistical methods (see, e.g., Johannes (2004), Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006), or
Huang and Tauchen (2005)) to identify jumps. Identifying jumps on EADs is even more
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Table A.1: Term Structure
This table provides the average term structure slope calculated as the difference between 30 and 60 days
ATM implied volatilities on trading days that are not strongly affected by earnings announcements (we
remove all data from 30 days prior to 5 days after an earnings announcement). The columns High Vol use
only trading dates on which the short-term ATM implied volatility is at least 50% above its average, the
columns Low Vol use only trading dates on which the short-term ATM implied volatility is more than 30%
below its average. The columns 5% and 95% provide the 5 and 95% percentiles, respectively.
Firm All 5% 95%
High
vol
5% 95%
Low
vol
5% 95%
AMZN -1.31 -7.01 1.87 0.36 -5.74 8.91 -2.25 -7.76 0.22
AIG -0.61 -3.72 2.01 -0.94 -6.36 4.26 -0.75 -2.64 0.89
AMGN -0.54 -4.09 2.31 0.87 -2.73 4.98 -0.95 -4.06 0.43
AAPL -1.82 -5.93 0.84 -1.05 -5.18 1.97 -1.97 -4.15 -0.05
BAC -0.52 -2.84 1.50 0.86 -3.53 7.23 -0.63 -2.32 0.59
BA -0.83 -2.87 1.01 0.68 -4.16 5.68 -0.80 -1.98 -0.07
CAT -0.97 -3.47 1.52 0.24 -4.84 5.40 -1.41 -3.31 0.04
JPM -0.03 -2.44 3.03 2.20 -1.63 7.94 -0.63 -2.07 0.50
CVX -0.08 -1.74 1.78 1.87 -1.23 7.45 -0.51 -1.66 0.22
CSCO -1.10 -5.27 2.20 0.67 -3.05 3.92 -2.78 -5.95 0.01
C -0.23 -2.38 2.11 1.19 -1.27 4.53 -0.57 -2.11 0.51
DELL -1.00 -4.88 2.94 1.44 -2.95 5.93 -1.75 -4.93 0.04
EBAY -0.96 -4.97 2.53 0.83 -2.63 5.62 -1.81 -4.56 0.01
XOM -0.20 -1.54 1.06 1.03 -1.01 4.20 -0.51 -1.40 0.09
FCX -0.24 -2.63 2.67 1.18 -3.42 7.74 -1.15 -2.81 0.13
GE -0.25 -2.40 2.01 1.34 -1.99 6.22 -0.61 -2.10 0.81
GS -0.00 -1.95 2.52 2.76 -0.21 11.41 -0.68 -1.61 0.08
INTC -0.83 -3.44 1.41 0.29 -3.05 3.74 -1.55 -3.37 0.03
IBM -0.77 -3.00 0.70 0.11 -2.05 2.82 -1.17 -3.04 0.09
JNJ -0.35 -1.85 0.86 0.60 -0.83 3.73 -0.58 -1.76 0.24
MRK -0.48 -2.55 1.25 0.51 -0.85 2.42 -1.22 -2.70 -0.03
MSFT -0.53 -2.86 1.40 0.67 -1.92 4.13 -0.86 -2.93 0.59
MS 1.14 -1.44 5.17 8.85 -1.15 28.63 -0.10 -1.62 1.77
NEM -0.38 -2.56 1.28 0.81 -0.77 3.53 -2.98 -5.34 -0.21
PFE -0.40 -2.27 1.64 1.25 -0.35 3.88 -1.12 -2.43 -0.06
MO -0.42 -3.20 1.70 0.21 -2.17 2.66 -0.91 -3.52 0.25
COP -0.70 -3.17 1.62 1.31 -2.22 5.24 -1.54 -4.75 0.29
PG -0.36 -1.96 0.88 0.09 -1.75 1.90 -0.70 -2.53 0.31
QCOM -0.80 -4.04 1.68 0.70 -4.27 7.15 -1.69 -4.35 -0.02
T -0.61 -2.11 0.62 0.30 -2.81 3.29 -1.01 -2.34 -0.15
X 0.04 -3.21 4.01 3.11 -2.49 12.15 -2.50 -5.24 -0.42
UPS -0.23 -1.82 1.12 0.80 -0.39 2.88 -0.49 -2.02 -0.00
VZ -0.48 -2.32 1.18 0.43 -1.71 2.58 -1.08 -2.74 0.06
WMT -0.35 -1.97 1.32 0.71 -1.79 4.42 -0.88 -1.93 0.25
WFC -0.47 -3.55 3.52 2.85 -2.74 12.08 -1.19 -2.67 -0.06
YHOO -1.07 -5.63 3.56 0.74 -5.32 8.56 -2.20 -5.84 0.30
NFLX -2.74 -11.58 1.97 2.30 -0.99 6.72 -4.81 -11.74 -0.16
SHLD -2.37 -7.16 1.44 -5.33 -14.81 0.83 -2.92 -6.76 1.24
GOOGL -1.22 -5.16 2.34 1.70 -2.63 6.07 -2.81 -5.03 -0.63
MA -0.91 -5.74 1.56 1.00 -7.15 9.42 -1.14 -3.85 0.00
FSLR -0.86 -6.58 4.14 4.58 -0.41 11.69 -1.94 -7.16 1.559
difficult in our setting as earnings are announced outside of normal trading hours.31
Since it is impossible to ascertain with discretely sampled prices whether or not there
is a jump, we consider the following intuitive metric. Strictly speaking, there will almost
always be a “jump” from close-to-open, as the opening price is rarely exactly equal to the
close price. For example, there are many events that could cause relatively minor overnight
movements in equity prices and result in a non-zero close-to-open movement: movements of
related equity and bond markets (e.g., Europe and Japan), macroeconomic announcements
such as employment or inflation (typically announced at 8:30 a.m. EST, an hour before
the formal market open), or earnings announcements of related firms to name a few. The
main difference, however, is that if our assumption of a jump on earnings dates is true, the
magnitude of the moves should be much bigger for earnings dates versus non-earnings dates.
Statistically, the movements should appear as outliers.
To analyze this issue, we compare the standard deviation of close-to-open to returns
on announcement and non-announcement days over our sample.32 Table A.2 provides the
standard deviation of close-to-open and open-to-close returns for earnings and non-earnings
dates and the ratios comparing earnings and non-earnings dates for all firms with at least 7
years of data. Note first that the results indicate that the close-to-open returns on earnings
dates are, on average, much more volatile. Average volatility of close-to-open returns on
earnings days was 5.93% compared to 1.59% on non-earnings dates. An F -test for equal
variances is rejected against the one-sided alternative at the one-percent critical level for
all but two cases for which the p-values are 3% and 6%. Since we usually identify outliers
as movements greater than three standard deviations, this is clear evidence of abnormal or
jump behavior.
31Barclay and Hendershott (2003, 2004) argue that, relative to normal trading hours, after-hour prices
are less efficient as bid-ask spreads are much larger, there are more frequent price reversals, and generally
noisier in post close or pre-open trading.
32We remove days on which dividends are paid from the sample.
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Table A.2: Close-to-open and Open-to-close Return Standard Deviation
This table provides a comparisons of close-to-open and open-to-close return standard deviation on earnings
(EAD) and non-earnings (non-EAD) announcements dates. We provide standard deviations, the ratio of
standard deviations and p-values of one-sided F -tests.
Ticker EAD
Non-
EAD
Ratio F -Test EAD
Non-
EAD
Ratio F -Test
Close-
Open
Close-
Open
Open-
Close
Open-
Close
AAPL 6.26 1.47 4.27 0.00 2.46 2.12 1.16 0.05
AIG 3.11 0.91 3.41 0.00 2.15 1.72 1.25 0.02
AMGN 3.71 1.22 3.04 0.00 2.79 2.10 1.33 0.00
AMZN 10.87 1.67 6.51 0.00 5.47 2.89 1.89 0.00
BA 2.61 1.06 2.46 0.00 2.25 1.62 1.39 0.00
BAC 2.61 1.29 2.02 0.00 3.84 1.95 1.97 0.00
C 2.55 0.99 2.58 0.00 1.84 1.55 1.19 0.04
CAT 4.58 1.01 4.55 0.00 2.57 1.68 1.53 0.00
COP 1.31 1.07 1.22 0.06 2.16 1.82 1.19 0.09
CSCO 6.71 1.28 5.23 0.00 2.60 2.20 1.18 0.03
CVX 1.02 0.83 1.23 0.03 1.46 1.44 1.01 0.43
DELL 5.80 1.42 4.08 0.00 2.94 2.37 1.24 0.04
EBAY 7.03 1.46 4.81 0.00 4.87 3.23 1.51 0.00
FCX 2.95 1.78 1.66 0.00 3.12 2.56 1.22 0.02
FSLR 12.57 1.98 6.34 0.00 5.00 3.69 1.36 0.01
GE 2.55 1.11 2.29 0.00 2.75 1.67 1.65 0.00
GOOGL 6.62 0.89 7.43 0.00 2.45 1.53 1.60 0.00
GS 2.97 1.23 2.41 0.00 3.56 1.86 1.92 0.00
IBM 4.40 0.81 5.41 0.00 2.06 1.37 1.50 0.00
INTC 5.18 1.31 3.95 0.00 2.84 2.00 1.42 0.00
JNJ 1.25 0.69 1.81 0.00 1.38 0.99 1.39 0.00
JPM 2.48 1.30 1.90 0.00 2.63 2.22 1.19 0.02
MA 4.76 1.16 4.11 0.00 4.18 2.04 2.05 0.00
MO 1.17 0.83 1.41 0.00 1.59 1.40 1.14 0.10
MRK 2.10 0.97 2.18 0.00 1.62 1.40 1.16 0.08
MS 4.69 2.44 1.92 0.00 3.64 2.86 1.27 0.02
MSFT 5.18 0.92 5.62 0.00 2.29 1.60 1.43 0.00
NEM 1.75 1.09 1.60 0.00 3.19 1.80 1.77 0.00
NFLX 19.50 1.62 12.02 0.00 5.94 2.75 2.16 0.00
PFE 2.69 0.91 2.94 0.00 1.90 1.32 1.44 0.00
PG 2.04 0.84 2.45 0.00 2.22 1.12 1.98 0.00
QCOM 5.70 1.39 4.11 0.00 2.99 2.41 1.24 0.00
SHLD 7.84 1.29 6.06 0.00 5.09 2.74 1.86 0.00
T 1.93 0.75 2.58 0.00 1.57 1.23 1.28 0.01
UPS 1.82 0.60 3.04 0.00 1.97 1.08 1.82 0.00
VZ 1.54 0.74 2.10 0.00 1.82 1.29 1.41 0.00
WFC 5.27 1.79 2.94 0.00 4.01 2.68 1.50 0.00
WMT 2.10 0.69 3.03 0.00 1.16 1.21 0.96 0.64
X 3.70 1.79 2.07 0.00 3.66 3.23 1.13 0.16
XOM 1.46 0.75 1.95 0.00 1.48 1.33 1.12 0.12
YHOO 7.71 1.94 3.97 0.00 3.86 2.80 1.38 0.00
Pooled 5.34 1.25 4.28 0.00 3.00 2.03 1.48 0.0011
Second, note that open-to-close returns are slightly more volatile on earnings dates than
non-earnings dates, on average 3.00% compared to 2.03% which indicates that returns are
slightly more volatile during the day following announcements. This could be due to a
number of factors, such as price discovery through trading, liquidity, or inefficient opening
procedures. Regarding the last point, Barclay et al. (2003) argue that the Nasdaq opening
procedure introduces more noise than the opening procedure on the NYSE and the effect is
exacerbated for smaller firms.
A.4 Nonparametric Tests: Empirical Results
This section provides further details on the nonparametric tests described in Section 4.2.
Table A.3 provides p-values (by calendar year and for the entire sample) for the Wilcoxon
and Fisher nonparametric test for our three main hypothesis: (1) IV increases prior to an
EAD; (2) the term structure of IV is downward sloping before the EAD; and (3) IV decreases
after the announcement. Table A.4 provides the statistical tests on the firm level. A detailed
discussion of our empirical results is provided in the main body of the paper (Section 4.2).
A.5 Error Analysis
In this section we study the error occurrences in Tables 4 and 6 in more detail. Our main
goal is to provide quantitative evidence whether errors can be linked to the presence of SV
and other market-microstructure effects. To understand the effect of SV on the likelihood
of errors, we first consider the term-structure estimator. It is clear from Equation (4) that
a low level of SV would bias σQterm downward due to the increasing volatility term structure
that would result from the mean-reversion of variance. Our model therefore predicts more
errors during low volatility regimes. For the time-series estimator, the main driver of errors
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Table A.3: Wilcoxon and Fisher tests (by calendar year)
This table provides the p-values for the Wilcoxon and Fisher nonparametric test, pooled by calendar year.
We use one-sided versions to test the increase in implied volatility in the two weeks prior to an earnings
announcement (Increase Prior to EAD), the decreasing term structure of implied volatility before the
earnings announcements (Term Structure on EAD), and the decrease in implied volatility after the earnings
announcement (Decrease after EAD).
Increase Prior to EAD Term Structure on EAD Decrease after EAD
Year Wilcoxon Fisher Wilcoxon Fisher Wilcoxon Fisher
2000 7.29e-20 3.24e-19 2.31e-30 6.23e-43 2.06e-22 4.90e-17
2001 1.54e-11 7.83e-11 1.11e-29 8.95e-42 7.46e-25 5.68e-22
2002 1.59e-16 1.04e-12 3.36e-30 6.09e-41 2.16e-24 2.09e-20
2003 4.52e-10 0.00027 2.02e-26 3.19e-31 1.54e-29 1.35e-39
2004 3.15e-19 3.19e-19 1.56e-20 1.31e-20 5.76e-26 3.88e-37
2005 9.77e-15 4.01e-11 2.12e-23 1.35e-25 6.96e-29 3.95e-31
2006 8.15e-26 3.38e-25 8.44e-33 3.72e-44 1.01e-28 2.57e-35
2007 4.10e-22 1.12e-18 1.09e-31 2.78e-40 4.00e-29 2.78e-40
2008 2.12e-17 1.04e-15 1.26e-31 6.71e-50 1.14e-24 1.89e-32
2009 0.00248 0.12221 7.71e-31 1.79e-42 3.75e-28 7.77e-39
2010 1.05e-08 1.55e-05 2.90e-29 6.22e-31 9.55e-29 2.03e-33
2011 3.34e-14 1.25e-09 4.16e-32 9.90e-39 2.81e-28 1.28e-35
2012 3.12e-23 5.98e-20 6.25e-33 2.53e-46 1.07e-30 3.43e-45
2013 7.43e-29 4.81e-31 1.69e-34 3.22e-54 1.66e-32 4.86e-46
2014 9.34e-23 1.18e-28 2.25e-34 4.98e-60 7.04e-33 3.86e-49
2015 2.06e-15 1.05e-19 1.24e-25 1.57e-41 1.62e-24 8.30e-37
Pooled 1.55e-235 5.69e-191 0.00e+00 0.00e+00 0.00e+00 0.00e+00
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Table A.4: Wilcoxon and Fisher tests (by firm)
This table provides the p-values for the Wilcoxon and Fisher nonparametric test for all firms with more
than seven years of EAD data from January 2000 until August 2015. We use one-sided versions to test the
increase in implied volatility in the two weeks prior to an earnings announcement (Increase Prior to EAD),
the decreasing term structure of implied volatility before the earnings announcements (Term Structure on
EAD), and the decrease in implied volatility after the earnings announcement (Decrease after EAD).
Increase Prior to EAD Term Structure on EAD Decrease after EAD
Ticker Wilcoxon Fisher Wilcoxon Fisher Wilcoxon Fisher
AAPL 3.31e-08 3.80e-09 2.65e-10 4.44e-16 2.81e-10 2.31e-14
AIG 0.00095 0.02139 1.83e-07 1.84e-08 1.17e-06 9.71e-07
AMGN 0.21198 0.16200 1.36e-07 9.29e-08 2.27e-07 7.28e-11
AMZN 6.92e-10 8.77e-11 1.84e-11 6.94e-18 5.17e-12 2.19e-16
BA 0.04441 0.27860 5.22e-05 2.82e-06 3.50e-05 0.00076
BAC 3.90e-08 2.86e-08 1.02e-09 1.21e-10 7.48e-05 9.90e-05
C 2.97e-07 4.48e-06 8.75e-09 1.39e-09 0.00217 0.00154
CAT 0.00060 0.00014 1.82e-09 1.42e-14 3.75e-09 1.54e-11
COP 0.52395 0.64945 1.20e-05 9.00e-05 0.00018 0.00046
CSCO 1.23e-11 1.73e-18 8.36e-12 8.67e-19 8.79e-12 5.29e-17
CVX 0.46441 0.24343 0.00096 0.01441 0.00050 0.00567
DELL 0.00028 1.37e-05 2.00e-06 3.73e-09 3.54e-05 1.52e-06
EBAY 0.00028 0.00125 9.13e-07 9.31e-10 9.13e-07 9.31e-10
FCX 0.08249 0.16839 1.25e-08 1.08e-10 1.30e-07 1.08e-10
FSLR 1.20e-05 7.75e-07 4.28e-05 2.09e-07 5.20e-06 2.09e-07
GE 2.44e-07 9.58e-06 8.45e-11 8.62e-15 4.92e-09 1.69e-08
GOOGL 4.04e-07 6.17e-08 5.80e-09 1.14e-13 7.17e-09 5.00e-12
GS 3.17e-09 2.90e-09 6.36e-11 1.55e-15 4.66e-10 4.28e-14
IBM 1.43e-11 4.24e-16 2.65e-12 1.08e-19 4.08e-12 6.94e-18
INTC 3.15e-11 2.82e-12 3.88e-12 2.17e-19 1.36e-11 4.24e-16
JNJ 7.99e-05 0.00299 9.30e-07 9.71e-09 4.22e-06 6.46e-06
JPM 5.56e-09 3.76e-07 2.05e-11 5.95e-14 2.30e-09 9.53e-12
MA 0.00039 0.00077 2.97e-06 7.45e-09 4.65e-06 2.09e-07
MO 0.03858 0.20252 0.16203 0.22569 2.50e-05 2.65e-06
MRK 0.23189 0.50000 6.93e-05 2.11e-05 3.69e-06 4.18e-06
MS 0.00022 0.00016 2.86e-06 2.32e-06 0.00062 0.00016
MSFT 5.52e-07 9.58e-06 3.88e-12 2.17e-19 6.06e-10 8.62e-15
NEM 0.47730 0.42528 0.00222 0.00468 0.00069 0.00046
NFLX 1.06e-05 7.75e-07 2.97e-06 7.45e-09 7.24e-06 2.09e-07
PFE 0.00034 0.00805 4.20e-07 1.23e-08 7.11e-05 2.77e-06
PG 0.00060 0.01785 2.28e-10 3.06e-13 3.08e-08 6.42e-10
QCOM 2.41e-06 1.04e-05 4.08e-12 1.37e-17 4.96e-12 4.24e-16
SHLD 0.00168 0.00732 2.15e-05 2.38e-07 0.00016 7.63e-06
T 0.05037 0.19576 1.15e-06 1.73e-06 3.20e-06 2.09e-07
UPS 0.02985 0.14314 1.79e-05 1.37e-05 6.36e-05 0.00016
VZ 0.24858 0.63583 1.07e-05 0.00016 9.54e-08 5.38e-10
WFC 0.00131 0.00166 6.17e-07 4.66e-10 0.00011 2.31e-07
WMT 3.53e-09 3.80e-09 3.36e-10 5.89e-13 9.58e-09 6.06e-08
X 0.62661 0.50000 9.91e-06 5.25e-06 0.00037 0.00076
XOM 0.06640 0.05864 1.78e-06 2.85e-05 4.00e-07 3.43e-07
YHOO 1.17e-08 8.09e-10 1.24e-09 7.11e-15 7.28e-09 3.41e-13
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is expected to be the level of vol-of-vol as higher vol-of-vol adds further noise to the change
of IV on EADs.
Our model also predicts that the probability of an error increases for firms with low
variance ratios (provided in Table 3). This is because an EAD jump is much easier to iden-
tify if the jump size standard deviation is large relative to the average day-to-day variation
in returns. Similarly, the signal-to-noise ratio is higher for options with shorter maturities
as their annualized return variance is dominated by EAD jump volatility. More errors are
therefore expected for estimators based on longer-term options and for firms with a low vari-
ance ratio. Another interesting possibility is to test whether the actually reported earnings
per share (EPS) affect the likelihood of an error. This is particularly relevant for the time
series estimator as it is based on ex-post data. It is intuitively plausible that a lower than
expected EPS leads to an increase in the perceived riskiness of the company, hence IV after
the earnings announcement may not drop as much as expected or may even increase.
We use a logit model to estimate the impact of aforementioned variables on the likelihood
of errors. We measure the volatility as the 30-day implied ATM volatility 10 days prior to
the announcement. The vol-of-vol is measured as the standard deviation of 30-day ATM
IV changes over 60 trading days prior to the announcement (the last volatility used is 10
days before the EAD). The variance-ratio is defined as in Table 3 and DTM measures the
days to maturity of the options used in the calculation of the time-series and term-structure
estimator.34 Finally, the earnings-surprise is given by the actual reported EPS minus the
analyst consensus in the month before the announcement, normalized by the equity price
ten days prior to the EAD. This definition coincides with DellaVigna and Pollet (2009).
Our findings are reported in Table A.5. We provide two sets of results for each estimator,
one with all aforementioned explanatory variables and one with a subset of variables. We
34For the term-structure estimator DTM is the maturity of the shorter-term option.
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Table A.5: Error Analysis: Logit Regression
This table provides results for a logit regression of the occurrences of errors in the time-series and
term-structure estimator of Section 2 on a range of explanatory variables. We measure the volatility as the
30-day implied ATM volatility 10 days prior to the announcement. The vol-of-vol (VolofVol) is measured
as the standard deviation of 30-day ATM IV changes over 60 trading days prior to the announcement
(the last volatility used is 10 days before the EAD). The variance-ratio is defined as in Table 3 and DTM
measures the days to maturity of the options used in the calculation of the time-series and term-structure
estimator.33 The earnings surprise is given by the actual reported EPS minus the analyst consensus in the
month before the announcement, normalized by the equity price ten days prior to the EAD.
Estimator Volatility VarRatio
Earnings
Surprise
DTM VolofVol
Term Structure Estimator -5.87 -0.26 9.37 0.02 27.57
(-7.85) (-6.45) (0.55) (5.18) (3.35)
-4.33 -0.27 0.02
(-7.80) (-6.66) (5.58)
Time Series Estimator -0.16 -0.07 1.25 0.01 3.72
(-0.68) (-4.17) (0.30) (2.99) (1.01)
-0.07 1.20 0.01 2.26
(-4.28) (0.29) (2.99) (0.72)
find broad support for our model predictions and that some of the errors are driven by
market-microstructure effects. The signs of DTM and the variance ratio variables are as
predicted and highly significant. The sign of the volatility variables is negative for the term
structure estimator indicating that lower levels of volatility increase the likelihood of an
error. For the time series estimator, we find that higher-vol-of-vol leads indeed to a higher
error occurrence, although the parameter is insignificant. Similarly, we find no significant
effect of earnings surprises which is reassuring as our estimator does not take into account
reactions to earnings announcement news.
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A.6 Impact of Stochastic Volatility
It is important to understand how the presence of SV could affect our tests. SV models
assume that Vt moves independently of earnings announcements, mean-reverting with ran-
dom shocks. Thus, even if earnings announcements are important, normal time-variation
in volatility could result in either an increase or decrease in volatility prior to an EAD, an
increasing or decreasing term structure of IV at an EAD, or an increase or decrease in IV
subsequent to an EAD. Thus, SV would introduce additional noise, biasing our tests toward
not rejecting, increasing the chances of Type II errors (not rejecting a false null). If, however,
anticipated uncertainty plays a dominant role (as Figure 1 would suggest), SV should have
a minor effect as the time or maturity variation in EIVt,Ti is swamped by the impact of
anticipated uncertainty.
One potential concern is that the increase in IV and the declining term structure of
IV prior to earnings could be driven by issues related to expiration cycles: as the time to
maturity decreases, option IV tends to increase. There are three reasons this is not a major
concern. First, and most importantly, if this is the case, it would have a mixed impact on
our tests. While it would bias the pre-earnings increase and term structure test towards
rejection, it would have the opposite effect on the time series test subsequent to earnings, as
the maturity bias would increase IV rather than decrease it. The fact that the time series
test of no decrease in IV subsequent to an EAD is rejected, and that the p-values for the
decrease are very low, implies that this is not a particularly important issue. Second, none
of our conclusions change if we remove all options with a maturity of less than one week.
It is difficult to imagine an alternative to our explanation for the strong predictable
behavior in IV. One potential explanation is Mahani and Poteshman (2008), who document
that retail investors increase holdings of options on growth firms prior to EADs. If supply
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is not perfectly elastic, increases in investor demand translate into increases in prices and
IV (see also Garleanu et al. (2009)). If, for some reason, retail investors were to sell their
entire positions the following day (and there is no evidence this occurs), prices and IV would
similarly fall subsequent to the earnings announcement. Could the demand of retail investors
generate the magnitudes observed in the data? For example, in the Intel example, could retail
investor behavior generate the pattern in IVs in the introduction?
We find it implausible that retail investors have such strong impact for three reasons.
First, returns on EADs are far more volatile than returns on other dates. This naturally
leads to an increase in IV prior to and decrease in IV subsequent to an EAD as shown by
our model. Second, retail investors make up a small portion of option market volume (about
10-15% according to Mahani and Poteshman (2008)). Third, while net demand factors are
statistically important, it is unlikely that they could explain the large movements in IV
around earnings dates. The results in Bollen and Whaley (2004) indicate that net buying
pressure of calls and puts significantly impacts changes in IV, but Garleanu et al. (2009)
find that the magnitude of the effect to be quite small. For the S&P 500 index, doubling
open interest in a day increases IV by 1.8%, which is within the bid-ask spread, and they
find the impact is smaller for individual firms. We conclude that our results provide strong
statistical evidence in support of our reduced-form model and its main implications. Option
IV increases leading into earnings announcements, the term structure declines for the first
two maturities, and IV decreases subsequent to the earnings announcement.
A.7 Parameter Estimates in Stochastic Volatility Models
This section provides further discussion of the estimates of structural parameters in the
stochastic volatility models presented in Section 4.7 (Table 13).
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In terms of structural parameters, the estimates of κQv are similar, between 0.52 and 1.70.
The corresponding parameters under the P-measure tend to be slightly larger, but smaller
compared to values reported for equity indices. This low level of risk neutral persistence is
intuitive, especially over our sample period from 2000 to 2015. Volatility was high at the
beginning and end, but low in the middle. A high κQv implies that volatility rapidly mean-
reverts, which would make it difficult to fit high and low volatility periods with a constant
θQv . For example, since θ
Q
v is an average of the two periods, when spot Vt is high, a high value
of κQv would imply a lower IV for longer dated options. As mentioned in the main body of
the paper, the volatility term structure (outside of months with EADs) is quite flat. The
only way to fit these periods is to decrease the level of mean reversion.
The estimates for θQv imply plausible long-run volatility means. Long-run volatility in SV
and SVEJ is roughly similar, decreasing when random jumps are added. The values for σv
are mainly identified by the time series of variance and from OTM options. The estimates
are consistent with prior work but are generally higher than estimates based on time series
data only (see the discussion in Broadie et al. (2007)). The parameters of the random jump
process imply between 1 to 10 jumps per year (with the exception of AMZN for which
we estimate a higher jump intensity), with average jump sizes close to zero and jump size
volatilities of 3.85% to 13.02%. Interestingly, the number of jumps decreases from SVJ to
SVJEJ, often by roughly the number of EADs indicating that some of the EAD jumps may
be incorrectly classified as random jumps in these models. Overall, our estimations provide
economically plausible parameters.
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